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ARTICLES
The Ballad of Transborder Arbitration
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU*
INTRODUCTION
International commercial arbitration (ICA) is many things positive.
Because business transactions cannot take place without a functional
system of adjudication, ICA has enabled parties to engage in and pursue
international commerce.' As a result, it has had an enormous impact
upon the international practice of law,2 the structuring of a de facto
international legal system,3 and the development of a substantive world
* Moise S. Steeg, Jr. Professor of Law, Tulane University, and Editor-in-Chief, World
Arbitration and Mediation Report. © Thomas E. Carbonneau. All Rights Reserved. Professor
Carbonneau has recently been appointed to the law faculty at the Pennsylvania State University-
Dickinson School of Law. The footnotes that follow are, in the main, selected bibliographic
references. In constructing these references, I relied upon the remarkable industry of Vrat Pechota
in HANS SMIT AND VRATISLAV PECHOTA, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION - AN INTERNATIONAL
BIBLIOGRAPHY (2d ed. 2001). It is an outstanding work of enormous value. I hereby acknowledge
my indebtedness to that reference work.
1. See, e.g., THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE
OF ARBITRATION 647-49 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE]; Grigera
Na6n, The Role of International Commercial Arbitration, 65 ARBITRATION 266 (1999); Howard
M. Holtzmann, Arbitration: An Indispensable Aid to Multinational Enterprises, 10 J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 337 (1975).
2. Many multinational law firms have large departments that specialize in international
litigation through arbitration. The leading firms appear to be Freshfields, Clifford Chance, and
White & Case.
3. There is no officially-recognized entity invested with political and jurisdictional authority
from a sovereign nation-state. Nonetheless, due to a variety of factors discussed in detail later in
the article (see text at notes 9-10 infra), the process of transborder arbitration functions as if it
were a state-sanctioned adjudicatory process. See Henry P. de Vries, International Commercial
Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for National Courts, 57 TUL. L. REV. 42 (1982); see also
Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1961); Bruno Oppetit,
Philosophie de l'Arbitrage Commercial International, 120 J. DU DROIT INT'L (CLUNET) 811
(1993).
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law of commerce.4 In a word, ICA has been a vital engine in the crea-
tion of a transborder rule of law.' Furthering this design, the arbitral
"method" has even been applied to the unruly political problems that
attend international trade and the implementation of international trade
policy. 6
Despite its service to the wealth-creating ambition of the interna-
tional business community, ICA represents an idealistic experiment in
transborder understanding and cooperation.7 The architects of the pro-
cess faced head-on the challenge of diversity. They confronted a wide
variety of cultural, historical, religious, national, regional, economic, and
political dispositions in erecting the process. Initially, as with any ven-
ture in transnational cooperation, optimism reigns and the horizons are
limitless. As actual discussions ensue, the idealistic embers die down,
and the proponents of harmony become increasingly unwilling to surren-
der advantage. The veneer of universal understanding begins to yield to
the uglier and more obdurate reality of self-interest. The founders of
ICA, therefore, engaged in and demonstrated an abundance of creativity,
ingenuity, and resourcefulness of a technical, legal, and political kind in
order to establish a workable process of adjudication that spanned the
range of international commercial disagreements and the breadth of
world laws and legal cultures.8 A bold and steadfast yet tolerant intelli-
gence needed to prevail at every stage of elaboration.
Sovereign state cooperation was indispensable to instituting the
process.9 ICA needed the approbation of states to benefit from munici-
4. See generally THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A
DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT (rev. ed. 1998) [hereinafter T. CARBONNEAU, LEX
MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION]. See also Bernardo M. Cremades, The Impact of International
Arbitration on the Development of Business Law, 31 AM. J. CoMp. L. 526 (1983); Jan Paulsson,
La Lex Mercatoria dans l'Arbitrage C.C.L., 1990 REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 55.
5. See FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, & GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
(Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999); RENE DAVID, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE (1985); see also Charles N. Brower, The Global Court: The Internationalization of
Commercial Arbitration, 26 U. BALT. L. REV. 9 (1997). Accord Philip J. McConnaughay, The
Risks and Virtues of Lawlessness: A "Second Look" at International Commercial Arbitration, 93
Nw. U. L. REV. 453 (1999).
6. See, e.g., COMMERCIAL MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION IN THE NAFTA COUNTRIES (Luis
MIGUEL DIAZ & NANCY ORETSKIN eds., 1999); R. Edward Ishmael, Jr., North American Free
Trade Agreement: Dispute Resolution Procedures, 2 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 455 (1991).
7. See, e.g., Geoffrey M. Beresford Hartwell, Arbitration: The Commercial Way to Justice?,
15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 179 (1997).
8. See CONFLICTING LEGAL CULTURES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: OLD ISSUES AND NEW
TRENDS (Stefan N. Frommel & Barry A. K. Rider eds., 1999); Christian Borris, Common Law and
Civil Law: Fundamental Differences and Their Impact on Arbitration, 60 ARBITRATION 78 (1994);
Michel Gaudet, Overcoming Regional Differences, 5 J. INT'L ARB. 67 (1988).
9. See William Lane, The Role of the Legislature and the Courts in the Development of the
Arbitration Process, 52 ARBITRATION 195 (1986); Riccardo Luzzatto, International Commercial
Arbitration and the Municipal Law of States, 157 RECUEIL DES COURS 9 (1977); George K.
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pal courts' status of legitimacy and their authority in order to function
effectively as a transborder system. State approval was facilitated by the
fact that the political or human rights of individual citizens were not
directly implicated by the development of a private transborder system
of adjudication-although the state's power to regulate commercial con-
duct was at play, might have to be delegated in whole or in part to arbi-
trators, and could eventually be substantially eroded. State affirmation
of ICA, however, was necessary to the transborder pursuit of business,
the integrity and execution of international commercial contracts, and
the proper operation of regional trade.
States needed to be persuaded to delegate the public function of
adjudication to a group of private actors and to the anonymous forces of
the marketplace. Moreover, the delegation of sovereign authority had to
be unequivocal and unqualified. Once undertaken, the deregulation of
transborder adjudication could not be altered or abandoned. It needed to
be continuous to avoid profound disruptions of commerce and the mar-
ketplace. Moreover, after it had been conferred, state approval needed
to become self-effacing. The transborder arbitral process had to operate
on its own and serve exclusively commercial objectives. In addition, a
variety of professionals-ranging from judges and lawyers to prospec-
tive arbitrators and the commercial users of the process-needed to
become unflinchingly loyal to a private system of adjudication to which
they owed neither political nor social allegiance. Finally, a synthesis of
highly disparate national approaches to law and legal adjudication
needed to be achieved in order to make the process work. A compara-
tive law analysis of enormous proportions was instrumental to the
process. 10
In matters of trial procedure, for example, it is well-settled that the
United States adversarial, party-driven model of trial differs greatly from
its civilian, judge-centered counterpart.'' In fact, the opposition can be
so radical on some matters that just results reached under one system are
deemed illegal in the other. Therefore, would the envisaged transborder
arbitral proceedings include pretrial discovery and cross-examination or
l'expertise judiciaire and le contradictoire? Divergences in national
substantive law also needed to be accommodated. For instance, would a
party reference to "the basic law of contract" include the doctrine of
Walker, Trends in State Legislation Governing International Arbitrations, 17 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 419 (1992); see also J. Stewart McClendon, State International Arbitration Laws: Are
They Needed or Desirable?, I AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 245 (1990).
10. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
11. On the basic differences between these systems in terms both of procedure and substance,
see HENRY P. DE VRIES, CIVIL LAW AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAWYER (1976); H. PATRICK
GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW (2000).
20021
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
mitigation of damages, the good faith obligation, and clear rules on the
passing of title? National laws contain variegated positions on these
issues. Which version of the law should prevail? Would party choice
always govern the resolution of such conflicts? Was party choice a suf-
ficient basis for decision? Should it always provide the final word in
commercial litigation? Also, in a more technical sense, would a contrac-
tual reference to a law of arbitration-in addition to the reference to a
law to govern the merits-create a concurrent governing law? If so,
how would the dual designation operate? Would the law of arbitration
dislodge the other law and be controlling or would it act as a default
mechanism-in all or some circumstances? What if the reference to the
law of arbitration was the only party designation? Would the substan-
tive law of that jurisdiction apply to the merits? Why? Why not?
Many of the challenges that arose from the diversity of national law
were successfully addressed within the process. A large number of
states endorsed ICA, 2 thereby shielding international arbitral agree-
ments and awards from national divergences and opposition. Currently,
more than 130 states' 3 have ratified the New York Arbitration Conven-
tion.' 4 The presumption of the enforceability of awards under the Con-
vention generally is respected and applied by the national courts of the
ratifying states. National court judges seem to have understood well the
lesson that the enforcement of arbitral awards is essential to the viability
of ICA, which, in turn, makes national participation in international bus-
iness possible. Moreover, the elaboration of a model arbitration law and
rules through the UNCITRAL framework 15 attests to the greater civiliza-
12. See, e.g., Charles L. Evans & Robert W. Ellis, International Commercial Arbitration: A
Comparison of Legal Regimes, 8 TiEx. INT'L L.J. 17 (1973); Bruno Oppetit, Les Etats et
l'Arbitrage International: Esquisse de Systdmatisation, 1985 REV. ARE. 493; Alain Plantey,
Introduction to International Arbitration, I ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BULL. 12 (1990); see also Richard
M. Mosk, International Arbitration, 10 WHTTIER L. REV. 195 (1988).
13. See, e.g., CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note I, at 707.
14. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for
signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (codified in 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-208
(1970)) [hereinafter the New York Arbitration Convention]. The literature on the New York
Arbitration Convention is voluminous. See, e.g., HANS SMrr & VRATISLAV PECHOTA,
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION-AN INTERNATIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 29-39 (2001) [hereinafter SMIT
& PECHOTA, BIBLIOGRAPHY]. The basic references and critical texts include: THE NEW YORK
CONVENTION (Giorgio Gaja ed., 1980); ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK
ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958 (1981). See also UNITED NATIONS, ENFORCING ARBITRATION
AWARDS UNDER THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: EXPERIENCE AND PROSPECTS (1999); ALBERT JAN
VAN DEN BERG, IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND AWARDS: 40
YEARS OF APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION (1999). Recent articles include: Alan
Scott Rau, The New York Convention in American Courts, 7 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 213 (1996);
David P. Stewart, National Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Under Treaties and Conventions, in
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: TOWARDS 'JUDICIALIZATION' AND
UNIFORMITY? 163 (Richard B. Lillich & Charles N. Brower eds., 1994).
15. See SMIT & PECHOTA, BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 14, at 58-66; see also Aron Broches,
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tion of the process. A basic consensus exists as to the applicable regula-
tory predicate and acceptable hearing procedures. Finally, there are
strong indications that arbitral awards are creating a substantive trans-
border law of commerce that is likely to be controlling in most
arbitrations. 6
A BRIEF HISTORY
In its contemporary embodiment,' 7 ICA emerged soon after the
Second World War-more than likely, as part of Western efforts to
export the virtues of capitalism and to maintain the unity and develop
the prosperity of the free world alliance. This initial phase of ICA's
development was restrained-due, in all likelihood, to the restrictions
that accompanied the cold war ideology. Because of East-West distrust
and competition, worldwide, unfettered commercial exchanges were not
possible. Ideological enclaves impeded the development of a uniform
position on international trade. Moreover, military and other dictator-
ships in Latin America contributed to regional instability and thwarted
the growth of national economies. Communist political parties within
Western European countries gave rise to statist social democracies, dem-
onstrating that capitalism was not assured a victory even among former
war allies. Finally, the key components of the Asian region had been
devastated by the war, subsequent conflicts, and the battles for ideologi-
cal primacy.
Eastern European countries took an internally unified position on
trade, but their insularity hardly gave the policy a larger credibility or
The 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: An Exercise in
International Legislation, 18 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 3 (1987); Gerald Herrmann, The UNCITRAL
Arbitration Law-Its Background, Salient Features, and Purposes, I ARB. INT'L 6 and 81 (1985);
Gerald Herrmann, The UNCITRAL, Arbitration Law: A Good Model of a Model Law, 3 UNIFORM L.
REV. 483 (1998); Vratislav Pechota, The Future of the Law Governing the International Arbitral
Process: Unification and Beyond, in T. CARBONNEAU, LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION,
supra note 4, at 257. See generally ISAAK DORE, ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION UNDER THE
UNCITRAL RULES: A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS (1986); ISAAK DORE, THE UNCITRAL FRAMEWORK FOR
ARBITRATION IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (1993); HOWARD HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH
NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND COMMENTARY (1989).
16. See FILIP DE LY, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND LEX MERCATORIA (1992); see also
supra note 4 and accompanying text; SMIT & PECHOTA, BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 14, at 325-28.
But see Georges S. Delaume, The Myth of the Lex Mercatoria and State Contracts, in T.
CARBONNEAU, LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION, supra note 4, at 111.
17. See generally IAN R. MAcNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION -
NATIONALIZATION - INTERNATIONALIZATION (1992); Sir Michael J. Mustil, Arbitration: History
and Background, 6 J. INT'L ARB. 43 (1989); Allan Philip, A Century of Internationalization of
International Arbitration: An Overview, in THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 25 (Martin Hunter et al. eds., 1995).
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scope.' 8 The Soviet bloc conducted trade among its members and
devised bureaucratic entities, known as trade commissions, to regulate
commerce within the bloc and to provide a framework for the resolution
of transactional disputes.' 9 The trade commissions created arbitral sys-
tems by which to implement dispute resolution. This arbitral process
was of narrow application and was subservient to the political ideology
of the bloc. Its purpose was to facilitate the achievement of statist poli-
cies, not to foster competition among free market forces.
Two events brought about a second, more advanced phase in the
development of ICA: (1) the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of
the cold war (symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989); and (2)
the eventual realization among leading international lawyers on Wall
Street that transborder arbitration was a force to be reckoned with in
international commerce.20 In fact, ICA had already begun to replace
domestic courts as the primary mechanism by which to address the
problems that attended the implementation of international contracts. At
this stage in its evolution, ICA was also bolstered by the advent of
"globalization," a reinvigorated form of international commerce done on
a truly worldwide basis. The pursuit of self-interest through economic
consensus and pragmatic cooperation took the place of the more destruc-
tive competition for ideological spheres of influence in the world com-
munity. In the 1990s, in fact, commerce replaced politics as the primary
18. See generally WILLIAM E. BUTLER, ARBITRATION IN THE SOVIET UNION (1989); J.
JAKUBOWSKI, PERMANENT ARBITRATION COURTS FOR FOREIGN TRADE IN POLAND (1962); J. Cuth,
The Arbitration Court of the Czechoslovakia Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 21 BULL.
CZECH. L. 94 (1982); Svetozar Hanak, The Experience of Socialist Lawyers in Arbitration Held in
Non-Socialist Countries on Litigations Between Businessmen from East and West, 10 INT'L BUS.
LAW. 145 (1982); Kaj Hob~r, Arbitration in Moscow, 3 ARB. INT'L 119 (1987); Simone Marie
Klechner, Foreign Trade Arbitration in Romania, 5 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 233 (1972);
Kalman Leloczky, East-West Arbitration: A Practitioner's Viewpoint from Hungary, 4 ARB. INT'L
266 (1988); Vladimir Orlov, Arbitration Procedure in East-West Trade, 55 NORDIC J. INT'L L.
310 (1986); Vratislav Pechota, International Economic Arbitration in the USSR and Eastern
Europe, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 377 (1987); Hilmar Raeschka-Kessler, Arbitration in
the Changed East-West Relationship, 21 INT'L BUS. LAW. 15 (1993); Frode Ringdal, Special
Features of International Arbitration in Norway, 49 ARBITRATION 91 (1983); Heinz Strohbach,
Arbitration in Berlin, 8 ARB. INT'L 185 (1992); Heinz Strohbach, Arbitration in Berlin Three
Years After the Watershed, 8 INT'L ARB. REP. 12 (1993); Heinz Strohbach, German Democratic
Republic: The Arbitration Court Attached to the Chamber of Foreign Trade, in HANDBOOK OF
INSTITUTIONAL ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 59 (E. Cohn et al. eds., 1977); Robert B.
von Mehren, Arbitration in Central and Eastern Europe: A Practitioner's View, 47 ARB. J. 38
(1992); Jaroslav Zourek, New Rules of Arbitration Proceedings in Czechoslovakia, 1963 BULL.
CZECH. L. 23.
19. See BUTLER, supra note 18.
20. See John Phillips, Arbitration: The Revolution of the 80's, 52 ARBITRATION 75 (1986);
Steven J. Stein & Daniel R. Wotman, International Commercial Arbitration in the 1980's: A
Comparison of the Major Systems and Rules, 38 Bus. L. 1685 (1983). See generally Albert Jan
van den Berg, Why Arbitration Will Be with Us Always, 65 ARBITRATION 248 (1999).
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language of the international community. Even the resistance of
China,2' Cuba,2 and Vietnam,23 to some degree, would attenuate over
time. The historically unprecedented bull market in the United States
buttressed the ethos of financial pragmatism which spread to Asian,
Latin American, and former Soviet-bloc countries. These countries
were seen as emerging and re-emerging markets that proffered possibly
enormous investment opportunities. Japan's fall into recession and its
enduring bear market were the principal exceptions to the reign of pro-
spective global financial prosperity.
During the 1990s, there was an eruption of UNCITRAL-inspired arbi-
tration laws throughout the globe-from Latin American countries to
Germany to former Soviet bloc states and Asian jurisdictions.24 More-
over, arbitral centers were created in various countries to compete for
the worldwide business of arbitration. 25 Most jurisdictions became hos-
pitable to arbitration. ICA no longer was relegated to specialists or con-
sidered a renegade process. It became the symbol of and the passport to
global capitalism and commercial prosperity. As noted earlier,26 the
success of ICA in the transactional area led to new vistas of application.
A new, more public-law-oriented mission was bestowed upon the pro-
cess. The arbitral procedural structure became a mechanism by which to
"depoliticize" divisive diplomatic and political disputes between
countries .27
The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal,28 created by the Algiers
21. See, e.g., Ren Jianxin, The Establishment and Development of Foreign Trade, Economic
and Maritime Arbitration in China, 1983 Y.B. SWEDISH & INT'L ARB. 53; Roug R. Yan &
Christopher Kuner, The New Arbitration Rules of the China International Economic Trade and
Arbitration Commission, 11 ARB. INT'L 183 (1995).
22. See, e.g., OCTAVIAN CAPATINA, LITIGIO ARBITRAL DE COMERCIo EXTERIOR (1985).
23. See, e.g., Kazuo Iwasaki, Arbitration of Foreign Investment Disputes in the Vietnam
International Arbitration Centre, 11 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 29 (1996).
24. See, e.g., International Rules & Procedural Arrangement, 3 WORLD ARB. REP. 3081
(2000); SMIT & PECHOTA, BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 14, at 58-66.
25. See, e.g., Nabil N. Antaki, The Qudbec National and International Commercial
Arbitration Centre, in COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN THE NAFTA COUNTRIES,
supra note 6, at 111; Vratislav Pechota, The British Columbia International Commercial
Arbitration Centre, 4 WORLD ARB. REP. 4211 (2001).
26. See supra text accompanying note 6.
27. See, e.g., Jan Paulsson, Cross-Enrichment of Public and Private Law Dispute Resolution
Mechanisms in the International Arena, 9 J. INT'L ARB. 59 (1992).
28. See GEORGE H. ALDRIDGE, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS
TRIBUNAL (1996); AIDA B. AVANESSIAN, IRAN-UNITED STATES TRIBUNAL IN ACTION (1993);
CHARLES BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES TRIBUNAL (1998); THE
IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 1981-1983 (R. Lillich ed., 1984); STEVEN TOOPE, MIXED
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: STUDIES IN ARBITRATION BETWEEN STATES AND PRIVATE PERSONS
(1990); David D. Caron, The Nature of the Iran- United States Claims Tribunal and the Evolving
Structure ofInternational Dispute Resolution, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 104 (1990); David L. Jones, The
2002]
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Accord of 1979,29 was the first significant experiment in this vein.
Despite a variety of shortcomings,3" the Tribunal successfully provided
compensation to the commercial interests that were affected by the Iran-
ian Revolution. It also developed an adapted arbitral procedure by
which to deal with the submitted claims.3 The Iraqi War Claims Com-
mission,32 located in Geneva, Switzerland, is in keeping with the experi-
ence of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal which still sits in the
Hague. The Iraqi Commission, however, will not be truly operative
until Iraq begins to sell oil in the world marketplace. A tax imposed on
the sale of oil funds the work and results of the commission process.
Chapters 19 and 20 of NAFTA gave the arbitral adjudicatory model, as
alluded to earlier,33 the even more ambitious task of acting as a mecha-
nism by which to resolve trade disputes between private parties and gov-
ernments and between the participating governments themselves.34 The
NAFTA process bestows upon private parties the extraordinary right to
arbitrate disputes about the impact of government conduct upon individ-
ual transactions directly with the foreign government.3 The recourse to
arbitration defuses such disputes-takes them out of the larger and more
volatile circumstances of political contention-and provides for their
resolution by impartial and expert adjudicators whose decision is basic-
ally final, binding, and enforceable. Government-to-government arbitra-
tion under NAFTA does not result in binding determinations, but rather
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: Private Rights and State Responsibility, 24 VA. J. INT'L L.
259 (1984).
29. See Bernard Audit, Les 'Accords' d'Alger du 19 Janvier 1981 Tendant au Re'glement des
Diffdrends Entre les Etats-Unis et llran, 108 J. Du DROIT INT'L (CLUNET) 713 (1981); Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, The U.S. Iranian Hostage Settlement, 75 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 236 (1981); Lloyd
N. Cutler, Negotiating the Iranian Settlement, 67 A.B.A. J. 996 (1981); Gerald T. McLaughlin &
Ludwick A. Taclaff, The Iranian Hostage Agreement: A Legal Analysis, 4 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
223 (1981).
30. See, e.g., Charles N. Brower, Lessons to be Drawn from the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, 9
J. INT'L ARB. 51 (1992); E. Lauterpacht, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal-An Assessment,
in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 213 (M.
Landwehr ed., 1982); Andreas Lowenfeld, The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal: An Interim Appraisal,
38 ARB. J. 14 (1983); Richard M. Mosk, Lessons from the Hague-An Update on the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal, 14 PEPP. L. REV. 819 (1987); Robert B. von Mehren, The Iran-U.S.A.
Arbitral Tribunal, 31 AM. J. COMp. L. 713 (1983). See generally RAHMATULLA KHAN, THE IRAN-
UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, CONTROVERSIES, CASES AND CONTRIBUTIONS (1990).
31. See, e.g., STEWART ABERCROMBIE BAKER & MARK DAVIS, THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION
RULES IN PRACTICE: TIE EXPERIENCE OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL (1992);
JACOMIJN J. VAN HOF, COMMENTARY ON UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES THE APPLICATION BY
THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL (1991).
32. See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note I, at 918.
33. See supra text accompanying note 6.
34. See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 880.
35. See Posin, The Multi-Faceted Investment Arbitration Rules of NAFTA, 13 WORLD ARB. &
MED. REP. 13, 15 (2002).
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seeks to frame the disputed matters in such a fashion so as to foster
settlement among the implicated states.
36
ICA IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY
ICA has a wide but uneven standing in the world community. It
originated in Europe and initially reflected the continental civilian pro-
cedural approach to adjudication. 37 The International Chamber of Com-
merce (ICC), which is headquartered in Paris, was a significant force
during the 1950s in drafting and fostering the widespread acceptance of
the New York Arbitration Convention. 38 The French government rati-
fied the Convention within months of its being opened for signature,
attesting to the importance it attached to the international arbitration pro-
cess. 3 9 Moreover, French courts progressively elaborated a judicial pol-
icy that heavily favored the recourse to and the effective operation of
ICA.40 France was the principal proponent of transborder arbitration at
the outset of its contemporary development. 4 Once the United States
government ratified the Convention in 1970 and the United States
Supreme Court began to issue rulings on transborder litigation and arbi-
tration,4" the doctrinal center of gravity shifted from Europe to the
36. See CARBONNEAu, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 880.
37. See generally RENE DAVID, L'ARBITRAGE DANS LE COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL (1982).
38. See W. LAWRENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION
(3d ed. 1999); Stephen R. Bond, I.C.C. Arbitration in Theory and Practice, 26 RASSEGNA DELL'
ARB. 141 (1986); Yves Drains, The Future of ICC Arbitration, 14 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 437
(1980); Frederic Eisemann, Arbitration Under the International Chamber of Commerce Rules, 15
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 726 (1966): Frederick Eisemann, The Court of Arbitration: Outline of Its
Changes from Inception to the Present Day, in INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 60
YEARS OF ICC ARBITRATION 391 (1984); Michel Gaudet, The International Chamber of
Commerce Court of Arbitration, 4 INT'L TAX & Bus. L. 213 (1986); Jan Paulsson, The
Contemporary Role of ICC Arbitration in Resolving International Business Disputes, 9 INT'L
TRADE & PRAC. 323 (1983); Alain Plantey, A Major Realisation of the ICC: International
Arbitration, 5 ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BULL. 3 (1994); Hans Smit, An Inside View of the ICC Court,
10 ARB. INT'L 53 (1994); Russeli Bennet Stevenson, Jr., An Introduction to ICC Arbitration, 14 J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 381 (1980).
39. See B. MOREAU & T. BERNARD, DROIT INTERNE ET DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE
L'ARBITRAGE (2d ed. 1985); JEAN-Louis DELVOLV8, ARBITRATION IN FRANCE, THE FRENCH LAW
OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (1982).
40. See Jean Pierre Ancel, French Judicial Attitude Toward International Arbitration, 9 ARB.
INT'L 121 (1993); M. Pierre Bellet, The Evolution of French Judicial Views on Ilternational
Arbitration, 34 ARn. J. 28 (1979); Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Elaboration of a French Court
Doctrine on International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Liberal Civilian Judicial
Creativity, 55 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1980).
41. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, American and Other National Variations on the Theme of
International Commercial Arbitration, 18 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 143 (1988).
42. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, I'Arbitrage en Droit Amnricain, 1988 REV. ARE. 3; Thomas
E. Carbonneau, Le Droit Amiricain de I'Arbitrage, in L'ARBITRAGE TRAVAUX OFFERTS AU
PROFESSEUR ALBERT FETTWEIs 205 (L. Matray & G. de Leval eds., 1989).
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United States. As noted earlier,4 3 when Wall Street lawyers finally
accepted the primacy of arbitration in transborder commercial litigation,
an even greater volume of international commercial litigation migrated
from domestic courts to transborder arbitral tribunals. The influence of
the Anglo-American legal profession extended to the structure of arbitral
proceedings, which began to mirror the basic characteristics of a United
States common law trial. In effect, the coexistence of two influential
centers of legal doctrine on arbitration instituted a struggle between the
European civil law and the Anglo-American common law for domi-
nance in the conduct of arbitral proceedings. This tension continues to
be present in contemporary arbitral practice.44
LATIN AMERICA
Accordingly, despite some reservations here and there about the
process, Northern Western countries accepted ICA as necessary and pro-
fessed support for the process. In recent times, ICA has become more
popular in formerly inhospitable regions like Latin America.45 Mexico's
adhesion to the consensus on ICA is a good example.46 Historically,
from the perspective of the Mexican government, the settlement of
boundary and other disputes through international claims commissions
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries made any recourse to
international adjudicatory processes suspect.47 The commissions were
seen (not inaccurately, in most instances) as an ill-disguised mechanism
by which the United States imposed its will upon its weaker, southern
neighbor and furthered its own interests. Accordingly, Mexico refused,
by and large, to participate in such proceedings and embraced the ratio-
nale of the Calvo Clause,48 providing for the national treatment of for-
eign investors and the exclusive reference to local remedies for the
resolution of foreign investment disputes. In response to the emergence
of globalization, Mexico revised its position on arbitration.49
In 1993, Mexico became one of the first Latin American countries
to adopt a modern arbitration statute based upon the UNCITRAL Model
43. See supra text accompanying note 20.
44. See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note I, at 613-24.
45. See, e.g., Cedric Barclay, Arbitration in Latin America, 43 ARBITRATION 105 (1977).
46. See Alejandro M. Garro, Mexico, 2A WORLD ARB. REP. 2059 (1994); Grigeria Na6n,
Arbitration in Latin America: Recent Developments in Mexico and Colombia, 4 JAHRBUCH
SCHIEDSGERICHTS BARKEIT 263 (1990); Josd Luis Siqueirois, Mexican Arbitration-The New
Statute, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 227 (1995); Josd Luis Siqueirois, Mexico, 15 Y.B. COM. ARE. 307
(1990).
47. See, e.g., Josd Luis Siqueirois, Mexico, supra note 46.
48. Id.
49. See supra note 46.
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Law.5" The Mexican endorsement of ICA symbolized a desire and will-
ingness to participate in world commerce on transborder terms. A num-
ber of other Latin American countries, including Brazil (1996), Bolivia
(1997), Colombia (1996), Costa Rica (1997), Ecuador (1997), Guate-
mala (1995), Panama (1999), Peru (1995), and Venezuela (1998), 5' fol-
lowed the Mexican example. These countries enacted modern,
UNCITRAL-inspired arbitration statutes. The new legislation, along with
the ratification of major international conventions on arbitration (the
Inter-American Conventions,52 the ICSID Convention,53 and the New
York Arbitration Convention),54 at least created the impression of a
favorable national posture toward arbitration.
The depth of commitment to ICA in the individual countries, how-
ever, is difficult to gauge accurately, especially in circumstances in
which the enforcement of an international arbitral award might be antag-
onistic to local interests or favor a national or corporate entity from a
country with a well-developed economy. Despite the adoption of a
modern statutory framework, courts in some of these countries might be
reluctant or refuse to enforce such international arbitral agreements and
awards. They could use procedural delay to thwart enforcement indi-
rectly or invoke the public policy exception to express direct opposition.
Thus far, the days of the Calvo Clause appear to be a bygone era. There
also seems to be a great enthusiasm among Latin American countries for
mediation (known there as conciliation). It is difficult to ascertain
whether mediation has become an effective competitor of arbitration in
50. See Julio Trevino, The New Mexican Legislation on Commercial Arbitration, 5 J. INT'L
ARB. 5 (1994); Isabel Zivy, La Nouvelle Loi Sur l'Arbitrage au Mexique, 1994 REV. ARB. 295.
51. See generally 2 & 2A WORLD ARB. REP., supra note 24.
52. The Inter-American (Panama) Convention on Arbitration of 1975, done at Panama City
on Jan. 30, 1975, entered into force Jan. 16, 1976, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 336 (1975); The Inter-
American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards
(May 8, 1979), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1224 (1979). See CHARLES NORBERG, INTER-AMERICAN
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1989); Charles Norberg, United States Implements Inter-American
Convention on Commercial Arbitration?, 45 ARB. J. 23 (1990); Alejandro M. Garro, Inter-
American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, 1975, 1 WORLD ARB. REP. 255.1
(1987); Alejandro M. Garro, The Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of
Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards, I WORLD ARB. REP. 265.0 (1992).
53. The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, reprinted
in 4 I.L.M. 532 (1965). See Aron Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, 136 REC. COURs 333 (1972); Georges R.
Delaume, La Convention pour le Riglement des Diffirends Relatifs aux Investissements Entre
Etats et Ressortissants d'Autres Etats, 93 J. Du DROIT INT'L (CLUNET) 26 (1966); Michael Moore,
International Arbitration Between States and Foreign Investors-The World Bank Convention, 18
STAN. L. REV. 1359 (1966); Christopher Schreuer, Commentary on the ICSID Convention, 12
ICSID REV. 60 (1997); 12 ICSID REV. 365 (1997); 13 ICSID REV. 150 (1998); 13 ICSID REV.
478 (1998); 14 ICSID REV. 421 (1999).
54. See supra text accompanying note 14.
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the Latin American setting and whether the current economic decline
and episodic political instability will have a substantial impact upon the
stature of ICA in the area.
Venezuela, until recently, illustrated the new Southern experience
with arbitration.5 In 1997, legislation was introduced in the Venezuelan
legislature to modernize the national legal regulation of domestic and
international commercial arbitration. Although Venezuela was a party
to several international conventions on arbitration, for example, the New
York Arbitration Convention and two Inter-American Conventions on
Arbitration, it had no national law that specifically regulated commercial
arbitration. A new Venezuelan law on arbitration was enacted in March
1998.56
The new law sought to create a modern statutory regime. It was
modeled upon the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on Arbitration. It regu-
lated the scope of arbitration, the types of arbitration agreements, the
arbitral proceedings, the powers of the arbitral tribunal, the functions
and obligations of the arbitrators, and the enforcement of awards. It
applied exclusively to commercial arbitration. The provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure on Civil Arbitration and the separate rules on
arbitration in the maritime, consumer, and agricultural areas remained in
effect.
The law achieved a number of interrelated objectives: (1) to give
national and international investors in Venezuela a sense of juridical
security; (2) to recognize and establish the contractual freedom of com-
mercial parties to submit their disputes to arbitration according to a
framework of provisions that best serves their interest; (3) to guarantee
the adaptability, impartiality, and integrity of the arbitral process as a
dispute resolution mechanism; (4) to conform Venezuelan law to inter-
national principles on the regulation of arbitration; (5) to allow Vene-
zuela to serve as a venue for international arbitration; and (6) to enable
Venezuela to compete with other Central and Latin American countries
which have enacted modern laws on arbitration.
The law's chief innovation resided in the establishment of a process
for the direct recognition and enforcement of international arbitral
awards. Title XIX of the Venezuelan Code of Civil Procedure requires
that foreign juridical acts, including international arbitral awards, be
submitted to an exequatur procedure for purposes of enforcement. 8
55. The author adapted the following commentary and description from his previous work.
See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 1040-45. See also Alejandro M. Garro,
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Under the exequatur procedure, the petition for enforcement is submit-
ted to the Venezuelan Supreme Court which can review both the form
and content of the foreign juridical act. An exception to the procedure
exists on the basis of reciprocity for countries that enforce Venezuelan
judgments without a review of the merits. Although it is unclear how
Venezuela's obligations under the various international treaties on arbi-
tration implicate the exequatur procedure, it appeared that-as a general
rule-international arbitral awards were subject to the exequatur proce-
dure. Because the action before the Venezuelan Supreme Court was an
ordinary civil proceeding not subject to any statute of limitation, the
enforcement process could create considerable delay and uncertainty.
The new legislation on arbitration eliminated the exequatur proce-
dure for the enforcement of international arbitral awards rendered in any
internationally-recognized country.5 9 Such awards were deemed final,
binding, and unappealable. The petition for enforcement was to be
brought before the Commercial Court of First Instance and was subject
to judicial supervision and vacatur essentially only upon the grounds for
nullifying an award.6 ° The streamlining and liberalization of the
enforcement procedure sent an unambiguous message that Venezuela
endorsed the global consensus on arbitration and wanted to be a player
in the global marketplace.
It should be noted, however, that the national resolve in favor of
ICA in some Latin American countries may be precarious. For example,
it is reported that, on December 13, 2001, the Supreme Court of Panama
ruled, with one dissenting vote, that the doctrine of kompetenz-
kompetenz was unconstitutional under Panamanian law.61 The court rea-
soned that arbitrators had no legal standing upon which to decide the
propriety of their jurisdiction. Only courts, using their publicly-con-
ferred authority, could rule on such questions. As the earlier European
history on arbitration illustrates with unmistakable clarity, such a ruling
(despite its formal conceptual rectitude) is highly antagonistic to the
interests and operation of arbitration. As a result of the opinion, every
arbitral proceeding held in Panama or subject to Panamanian law is vul-
nerable to a jurisdictional challenge before a court either at the head or
at the back end of the proceeding. This opportunity for dilatory obfusca-
tion can easily result in a two-year or longer delay and the eventual
nonenforcement of the award. This development shall hinder considera-
bly the recourse to arbitration in Panama.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. Interview between the author and a Panamanian lawyer (Eric Britton-Gallardo), Jan. 30,
2002.
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ASIA
By comparison, ICA has an ambiguous standing in Asian countries,
such as Japan, Singapore, the new Hong Kong, and India. The Japanese
endorsement of ICA is limpid and unenergetic.62 Institutional centers
for the conduct of international arbitrations have existed in Japan for
years, but the volume of cases has never been substantial and a strong
internal arbitration community has never been established. Nonetheless,
Japan is a party to all of the major international conventions on arbitra-
tion, including the New York Arbitration Convention.63 Arbitral awards
generally have the same effect in Japan as the final and binding judg-
ments of a court of law. The Japanese Chamber of Commerce and
Industry maintains a Commercial Arbitration Association.' The Japan
Commercial Arbitration Association (JCAA) is one of Japan's best
known arbitral institutions; established in 1953, it resolves disputes aris-
ing from international and domestic business transactions. The JCAA
has cooperative agreements with thirty-three major arbitral institutions,
including the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the London
Court of International Arbitration (LCIA).65
The Japan Shipping Exchange, Inc. (JSE) conducts maritime arbi-
trations through the Tokyo Maritime Association Commission
(TOMAC). The JSE came into being in the mid-1930s and progres-
sively expanded the range of maritime disputes that were submitted to
arbitration. Despite its national and historical significance, the JSE does
not handle a huge volume of business (at least, by New York and
London standards).66 Since its inception, the JSE has had some 450
cases. 67 Arbitral awards rendered through JSE and TOMAC arbitration
are made public on an anonymous basis.68 The objective of this practice
is to foster the understanding of the arbitration process and its suitability
for resolving commercial disputes. The public availability of awards
also is meant to heighten the development of commercial custom and
practices.
The protracted arbitral procedure described in Fotochrome, Inc. v.
62. The author adapted the following commentary and description from his previous work.
See CARBONNEAu, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 1046-48. See also Hagizawa, The
Prospective Revision of Japanese Arbitration Law, 13 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 17 (2002);
Robert Bennet Lubic, International Commercial Arbitration in Japan: Background and
Suggestions, 2 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 87 (1991). See generally PHILIP MCCONNAUGHAY &
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Copal Co., 6 9 attests to the strong cultural preference in Japan for negoti-
ated dispute settlement rather than adjudication.7" In fact, private, unof-
ficial adjudication is seen as the worst form of adjudication. While
participation in court proceedings may constitute a public humiliation
under Japanese concepts, the authority of the judge at least is conferred
by public processes. By contrast, the arbitrator's mandate results merely
from private agreement. Some commentators have ascribed the static
state of arbitration in Japan to the fact that few Japanese attorneys speak
English. Linguistic insularity contributes to the lack of outreach. Also,
the Japanese code provisions on arbitration are dated.7 They were bor-
rowed from the German codes and, as a result, reflect a nineteenth-cen-
tury view of the legal regulation of arbitration. 72 In 1979, a law group
was commissioned to draft a new arbitration law.73 In 1989, the group
completed a draft law that contained modern provisions and modern
principles of arbitration law. 74 The draft law, however, has yet to be
introduced into the Japanese diet. Other area-wide reforms-in banking
or product liability-may be considered more pressing by government
officials. In any event, the Japanese misgivings about arbitration are not
shared by the other major players in international trade and commerce.75
Finally, these features of Japanese arbitration indicate that Japan is not
ready to assume a position of regional leadership in ICA.
Singapore76 differs significantly from Japan in its approach to ICA.
It appears eager to become the Asian center for ICA. Recently, it has
adopted new laws that favor arbitration. 77 There also is an administra-
tive center for arbitration that actively supports the recourse to arbitra-
69. 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975).




74. A copy of the original draft of the proposed law is contained in: THOMAS E.
CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION DOCUMENTARY
SUPPLEMENT 137 (1997).
75. See Hagizawa, supra note 62.
76. See Lawrence Boo, Singapore, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION (P. Sanders & A. Van Den Berg eds., Supp. Aug. 21, 1996); Thomas R. Kloetzel,
Arbitration in Singapore-Recent Developments, 61 ARBITRATION 108 (1995).
77. See Robert Morgan, The Arbitration Act 1996 and Arbitration Law Reform in Hong Kong
and Singapore: A Brave New World?, 1997 ARB. & DISP. RES. L.J. 177; see also Lawrence Boo,
Singapore's International Arbitration Act 1994-Some Salient Features, 1996 ARB. & DIsP. RES.
L.J. 200; Lawrence Boo & Charles Lim, Overview of the International Arbitration Act and
Subsidiary Legislation in Singapore, 12 J. INT'L ARB. 75 (1995). See Arbitration Legislation in
Singapore, 13 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 7 (2002); Domain Name Dispute Resolution in
Singapore, 13 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 5 (2002).
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tion in the international marketplace. 8 In seeking to assume a dominant
position, however, Singapore must contend with the new Hong Kong.79
Prior to the historic reunification in 1999, Hong Kong was a bustling
center of capitalism and could serve as a meeting place for East-West
business interests. Its present-day ability to act as a venue for interna-
tional business and commercial adjudication is uncertain. Historically
and geographically, it is an ideal setting for achieving such intermedia-
tion. Ultimately, its status within the global commercial community will
be decided by the vicissitudes of both internal Chinese and international
politics.8" Moreover, with the formation and development of CIETAC
arbitration,8" China as a whole is attempting to become a player in the
area.
Arbitration in China is governed by the 1995 Arbitration Law and
the 1991 Civil Procedure Law." The Arbitration Law of China was
enacted to ensure the fair and timely arbitration of disputes relating to
economic matters. China maintains a bifurcated approach to foreign-
related and domestic arbitration cases, applying distinct sets of rules and
procedures for conducting arbitration proceedings and enforcing awards
under each category. 3 China's courts commonly consider a case for-
eign-related only in circumstances in which at least one party to the
dispute is registered in a foreign jurisdiction or is a foreign national; the
subject matter of the transaction is foreign; or the legal relationship was
made, amended, or terminated outside China.84 Cases involving exclu-
78. See Joseph Bellhouse, Singapore: International Arbitration Center Established, 3 ASIA L.
& PRAC. 31 (1991).
79. See N. KAPLAN ET AL., HONG KONG ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (1991); N.
KAPLAN ET AL., HONG KONG AND CHINA ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (1994); R.
MORGAN, THE ANNOTATED ORDINANCES OF HONG KONG-THE ARBITRATION ORDINANCE (1996);
R. MORGAN, THE ARBITRATION ORDINANCES OF HONG KONG: A COMMENTARY (1997); Charles
Lin, Enforcement of Mainland China's Arbitral Awards in the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region After 1 July 1997, 65 ARBITRATION 56 (1999).
80. See Michael J. Moser, China-Hong Kong Enforcement Arrangement Becomes Effective,
15 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 24 (2000); Michael J. Moser, Hong Kong and Mainland China
Sign Agreement for Reciprocal Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, 14 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP.
22 (1999).
81. See Huang Yamming, Some Remarks About the 1994 Rules of CIETAC and "China's
New International Arbitration Rules," II J. INT'L ARB. 105 (1994); Ge Liu & Alexander Lourie,
International Commercial Arbitration in China: History, New Developments, and Current
Practice, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 539 (1995); Michael J. Moser, China's New International
Arbitration Rules, II J. INT'L ARB. 5 (1994); Michael J. Moser & Zhang Yulin, The New
Arbitration Rules of the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, 13 J.
INT'L ARB. 15 (1996); Vratislav Pechota, China International Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commission (CIETAC), 4 WORLD ARB. REP. 4315 (2000).
82. The author adapted the following commentary and description from his previous work.
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sively Chinese-registered entities and transactions located in China are
considered domestic. When hearing an action for the enforcement of a
domestic arbitral award, the People's Court can review both the arbitral
procedure and the substance of the award.85 The Law of Civil Procedure
provides that the award shall be denied enforcement if the People's
Court determines that the main evidence is insufficient to support the
allegations made in the record.
In China, international arbitrations or arbitrations with a foreign
element are administered almost exclusively by two arbitral institutions.
The China Maritime Arbitration Commission (CMAC) administers the
arbitration of maritime disputes.86 The China International Economic
Trade and Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) administers the arbitra-
tion of disputes that arise from foreign-related economic and trade activ-
ity.87 CIETAC represents an acknowledgement by the Chinese
government of the necessity of international trade and commerce and the
central role of arbitration in stabilizing the international marketplace.
The initial experience with CIETAC as a provider of institutional
arbitral services appeared to be very promising. The annual caseload
was enormous on a comparative basis-700 or 800 cases yearly, for
example, to the ICC's otherwise leading 450 to 500 cases. The amount
of money involved in these cases, however, was substantially inferior to
the money involved in a typical ICC case. Also, to a considerable
extent, the creation of CIETAC arbitration reflected an insular objective
on the part of the Chinese government: If foreign nationals and compa-
nies wanted to do business in China, and if they demanded arbitration as
the means of resolving transactional disputes, arbitration would take
place on Chinese terms. Chinese government policy in this area, there-
fore, was protectionist and was based upon a characteristic distrust of
foreign practices and parties. CIETAC arbitration was not made
accountable to the usual competitive forces of the international
marketplace.
The contemporary experience with CIETAC arbitration portends a
less promising future. CIETAC's annual volume of cases has decreased
steadily since 1996 and there are reports that CIETAC proceedings are
subject to local influence and corruption.88 Hong Kong authorities, in
particular, have expressed serious reservations about the credibility,




88. See CIETAC Arbitration May Be Declining in Stature and Performance, 12 WORLD ARB.
& MED. REP. 304 (2001).
89. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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for the moment, CIETAC's ascendancy has been stymied and retrogres-
sive dispositions appear to be controlling its development.
Other members of the Asian communist world seem to be embrac-
ing arbitration and international commerce. Despite long-standing diffi-
culties, Vietnam has demonstrated of late a genuine willingness to
comply with the quid pro quos of ICA.90 In late 2001, the Lam Dong
People's Court confirmed an arbitral award rendered by the International
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ICCI) in Geneva, Switzerland
against a Vietnamese company and in favor of a South Korean com-
pany.9 The arbitrators ruled that the Vietnamese company, the Vietnam
Sericulture Corporation (Viseri), breached its contract with the South
Korean Kyunggo Silk Company.92 The award required Viseri to pay
(US) $425,891 to the Korean enterprise.93 The court rejected Viseri's
arguments opposing the enforcement of the award. 94 Remarkably, it
held that the award "conformed to international practices, the Vietnam
Trade Law, and the ordinance on international arbitration in Vietnam. 95
The willingness to accept both the losses and gains associated with
international commercial activity is instrumental to a country's effective
integration into the stream of international business. Courts and national
legislation cannot simply pursue the protection of nationals or national
economic interests in transborder economic exchanges but must uphold
the universal role of contract and embrace the practices of the interna-
tional commercial community. Constraining business by state-con-
trolled systems cannot result in meaningful national economic growth
and development. In this case, Vietnam has exhibited a desire to accept
the discipline of the international marketplace and of the transborder rule
of law.
Finally, in the last several years, India has endeavored to revise its
position on ICA.96 Its previous reservations may have stemmed from
90. See Le Cong Dinh, Arbitration in Vietnam, I I WORLD ARE. & MED. REP. 164 (2000); Ha
Hung Cuong, Le Droit Vidtnamien sur IArbitrage Economique et Sur la Reconnaissance et
I'Exdcution des Sentences Arbitrales Etrangres au Vietnam, 49 REV. INT'L DR. COMP. 919
(1997); Kazuo Iwasaki, Arbitration of Foreign Investment Disputes in the Vietnam International
Arbitration Centre, II MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 29 (1996); Thuy Le Tran, Vietnam: Can An
Effective Arbitration System Exist?, 20 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 361 (1998); Tran Huu
Huynh, Le Centre d'Arbitrage International du Vijtnam, 49 REV. INT'L DR. COMP. 913 (1997).
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geo-political positioning and been grounded in political ideology. In
any event, in 1996, India adopted the Arbitration and Conciliation Ordi-
nance based upon the UNCITRAL Model Law on Arbitration. 97 The pur-
pose of the legislation was to stabilize the arbitration system in India and
to encourage foreign investment.98 The then-Prime Minister told Indian
lawyers that it was necessary to bring Indian laws on the settlement of
disputes in line with international standards because the economy was
undergoing substantial reforms. Previous arbitration acts required court
decrees to enforce arbitral awards, and courts were given wide latitude
to vacate awards. The new ordinance made several improvements to the
prior law. It allowed arbitral tribunals to promote the use of conciliation
during the arbitral proceeding in order to encourage the parties to settle
the dispute.9 9 If the parties settled during the arbitral proceeding, their
agreement would be recorded and given the same effect as an arbitral
award. An arbitration award or settlement pursuant to conciliation was
automatically deemed a decree of an Indian court, thereby expediting the
enforcement of the determination. There were fewer grounds for setting
aside an award. Finally, the ordinance required a party challenging a
domestic award to deposit the amount of the award in court prior to
filing its challenge.' °°
Moreover, parties were given the freedom to control many aspects
of the arbitration process through the arbitration agreement. Among
other things, the parties could control the number and selection of arbi-
trators, the procedure of the arbitration, the presentation of evidence, and
the use of experts.' 0' There were, however, mandatory requirements
regarding the conduct of the arbitral proceedings. If the arbitration took
place in India, and the conflict being adjudicated was not an interna-
tional commercial dispute, the tribunal had to decide the dispute in
accordance with Indian laws. 0 2 When the dispute was international, the
arbitral tribunal decided by reference to the rules of law designated by
the parties.0 3 If the parties did not select an applicable law, the tribunal
would apply the rules of law it considered appropriate in the
circumstances. 104
Under the ordinance, an arbitral award could be set aside if: (1) an
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under the applicable law; (3) a party was not given proper notice of the
appointment of the arbitrator or of the proceedings; (4) the award dealt
with a dispute outside the scope of the arbitration agreement; or (5) the
composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure violated
Indian public policy.' 0 5 Parties were obligated to file an action to set
aside the award within three months of the date of rendition.° 6 Domes-
tic awards become effective as a decree of the court three months after
rendition. Enforcement of a foreign award could be refused only if, in
addition to the reasons for vacating a domestic award, the award had not
yet become binding on the parties, or the subject matter was not capable
of settlement by arbitration under Indian law.'0 7
In addition, the Indian Supreme Court, in several recent rulings,'
interpreted the newly-enacted legislation in a way that favors arbitration.
Although there have been clear efforts to establish India as a jurisdiction
that is supportive of international arbitration, attempts to promote arbi-
tration and ADR domestically have generally met with less success. The
crowded court dockets make such alternative processes a virtual neces-
sity, but the establishment of centers and programs have not had the
desired educational impact upon the legal profession and the public.0 9
PROBLEMS AND DISSENTING POSITIONS
However well-established ICA may be in the legal civilization of
the world community, it remains possible, even under Article V of the
New York Arbitration Convention,' 1o to thwart the enforcement of an
international arbitral award. In an unreported case, for example, a Sri
Lankan court refused to enforce an LCIA arbitral award.' The award
on the merits appeared to be perfectly sound. It involved a straightfor-
ward ruling on a clear-cut and expensive breach of contract. The proce-




108. See Indian Supreme Court Rejects Award of Pre-Reference Interest by Arbitrator, 8
WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 287 (1997); Supreme Court of India Rules that Arbitral Award
Rendered in Ukraine is Enforceable, 9 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 127 (1998); India Increasingly
Supportive of Mediation, 9 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 128 (1992); Arbitration and ADR
Developments in India, 9 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 150 (1992).
109. See supra note 108. The most recent revision of national law in the Asian region is
Indonesia. See Yayan Mulyana & Jan Schaefer, Indonesia's New Framework for International
Arbitration: A Critical Assessment of the Law and its Application by the Courts, 17 MEALEY'S
INT'L ARB. REP. 39 (2002).
110. For references to the New York Arbitration Convention, see supra note 14 and
accompanying text.
I 11. See generally COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION LAW IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (K. Simmonds
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conformity with generally-accepted standards. Despite the compliance
of the award to existing standards, the Sri Lankan court ruled that the
award could not be enforced because it violated domestic public policy.
Additionally, in the celebrated Chromalloy case, 1 2 the Cairo Court
of Appeals set aside an ICC arbitral award rendered in Egypt against the
Egyptian Air Force and in favor of a Houston, Texas company because,
in its view, the arbitrators did not correctly apply Egyptian law in their
ruling. While such a ground is a legitimate basis for nullification under
the New York Arbitration Convention,1 3 the court's evaluation of the
arbitrators' application of law was quite strained.
These enforcement rulings constitute unfortunate and poorly-dis-
guised attempts to protect nationals or national entities from basic con-
tract accountability.'"' Pervasive protectionism could foil the entire
transborder arbitral process. In addition, protectionism is more likely in
countries outside the Northern-Western consensus on arbitration. Oppo-
sition to ICA can be based upon factors like political ideology, disparate
views of economic development, differences in religious belief, or the
lack of a truly functional rule of law or national legal and political
institutions.
For example, despite their ratification of the New York Arbitration
Convention, the former republics of the U.S.S.R., including the Russian
Republic itself, may not benefit from the type of internal institutional
and social stability that is necessary for the effective enforcement of
international arbitral awards.'" Without the discipline of enforcement,
112. In re Arbitration of Certain Controversies Between Chromalloy Aeroservices & the Arab
Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
113. For references to the New York Arbitration Convention, see supra note 14 and
accompanying text.
114. On this question, see, for example, Philippe Fouchard, Le Portge Internationale de
I'Annulation de la Sentence Arbitrale dans son Pays d'Origine, 1997 REV. ARB. 329; Emmanuel
Gaillard, The Enforcement of Awards Set Aside in the Country of Origin, 14 ICSID REV.-FOR.
INv. L.J. 16 (1999); Hamid Gharavi, Enforcing Set Aside Arbitral Awards: France's
Controversial Steps Beyond the New York Convention, 6 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 93
(1996); Hamid Gharavi, Chromalloy: Another View, 12 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 21 (1997);
Hamid Gharavi, The Legal Inconsistencies of Chromalloy, 12 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 21
(1997); Jan Paulsson, The Case for Disregarding LSAs (Local Standard Annulments) Under the
New York Convention, 7 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 99 (1996); Jan Paulsson, Rediscovering the N.Y
Convention: Further Reflections on Chromalloy, 12 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 20 (1997).
115. See William E. Butler, Arbitration Clauses in the Post-Soviet Era, 1993 Y.B. SWEDISH &
INT'L ARB. 17; Vincent Godbillon, La Problmatique Actuelle de lArbitrage Commercial
International Russe, 17 BULL. SWISSE ARB. Assoc. 285 (1999); Andrei M. Gorodissky,
Arbitration in Russia, in LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 103
(D. Rivkin & C. Platto eds., 1998); Jeffrey M. Hertzfeld, The Status of Arbitration Agreements
and the Arbitral Process in the States of the Former Soviet Union, 1993 Y.B. SWEDISH & INT'L
ARB. 27; Peter B. Maggs, International Business Contract and Arbitration Law in the Former
Soviet Union Republics, 7 INT'L ARB. REP. 18 (1992); Burke McDavid, Arbitration-Alternatives
with a Russian Party, 32 INT'L LAW. 119 (1998); Vratislav Pechota, Russian Federation, 2A
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arbitration is substantially weakened and foreign business interests have
almost no means of protecting investments. The circumstances of for-
mer Soviet bloc countries are made difficult by the internal strife that
paralyzes the operation of domestic institutions and by the special Rus-
sian view of arbitration as consisting of specialized commercial courts
operated by the government.' 16
Further, the exploitation of national resources and the sale of com-
modities in some settings may fall under the exclusive dominion of the
re-emerging state. Under its law, the state alone-through sovereign
fiat-determines legal accountability within the local territory," 1 7 mak-
ing a rule of law through arbitration or another process impossible. The
variegated religious composition of a country or other sociological fac-
tors may also have a bearing upon whether the transborder arbitral pro-
cess can operate effectively within a country. The circumstances of
developing, emerging, or re-emerging states are elusive and shifting.
They are always more complicated than initially envisaged. These con-
siderations make it even more difficult to establish a firm commitment
to ICA among these countries.
The most visible "hold-outs" from the international consensus on
arbitration have been, by and large, the Middle Eastern Muslim coun-
tries.'8 Saudi Arabia appears to be the country that has taken the most
negative position on ICA, questioning its value, origins, and legiti-
macy. 1 19 For example, although the Saudi government has ratified the
New York Arbitration Convention, 2 ° Saudi law makes the enforcement
of an international arbitral award difficult and time-consuming. Such an
award is enforceable only if it is accompanied by a court judgment from
the state of rendition.' 2 ' The award must be authenticated by the Saudi
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Saudi Ministry of Justice, and the Saudi
consulate in the state of rendition. 122 Moreover, an award not rendered
in Arabic must be translated by a sworn translator before it can be sub-
WORLD ARB. REP. 2355 (1994); Volker Viechtbauer, Arbitration in Russia, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L.
355 (1993).
116. See Pechota, supra note 115, at 2355.
117. See generally id.
118. See generally SMIT & PECHOTA, BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 14, at 661-63.
119. The author adapted the following commentary and description from his previous work.
See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 38-39. See also M.I.M. Aboul-Enein, The
Development of hiternational Commercial Arbitrating Laws in the Arab World, 65 ARBITRATION
314 (1999); Nancy B. Turck, Saudi Arabia, it? INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION (P. Sanders & A. Van Den Berg gen. eds., Supp. Jan. 17, 1994). See generally
ABDUL HAMID EL-AHDAB, ARBITRATION WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES (2d ed. 1999).
120. See Abdul Hamid EI-Ahdab, Saudi Arabia Accedes to the New York Convention, J. INT'L
ARB., Sept. 1994, at 87.
121. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
122. See id.
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mitted to the Saudi government through proper diplomatic channels. 2 3
The Saudi government reserves the right to refuse enforcement of an
award. 124 Awards rendered by default against a Saudi party are auto-
matically unenforceable. 25 This rule can give Saudi parties an enor-
mous advantage in international litigation if all their assets are located in
Saudi Arabia. Enforcement of awards from countries that are not mem-
bers of the Arab League Convention is based on reciprocity. If an award
is not enforceable, the party holding the award may file an action before
the Saudi Board of Grievances to obtain a determination of the dispute
under Saudi law. 126 An award rendered against the Saudi government or
its agents is not enforceable. 27 If the Saudi government or its agencies
are a party to a contract, arbitration is prohibited unless the President of
the Council of Ministers consents to the provision.
Bahrain is the Arab state that appears to be most adapted to the
Western view of international commercial arbitration. In Decree No. 9
of August 16, 1994, it adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on arbitration
with very few changes. 128 Previously, in Decree No. 9 of May 20, 1993,
the Bahrain Centre for International Commercial Arbitration was estab-
lished.' 29 The Centre uses the UNCITRAL Rules on Arbitration and
enforces awards in accordance with the New York Arbitration Conven-
tion.' 30 Bahrain acceded to the Convention in 1988.' 31
ICA certainly cannot eradicate or even subdue all of the tensions
and conflicts that exist among nations in the world community. The
international practitioner must be attentive to the local variations that
can exist on a given theme or problem of arbitration law. Despite the
diversity of views within the family of nations, globalization has
emerged and participation in international commerce is seen by most
countries as a desirable objective. A system of transborder arbitration is
essential to the pursuit of commerce across national boundaries. There-
fore, countries at least pay lip-service to ICA; many of them are attempt-
ing to become an integral part of the process; yet others have fully
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THE BUSINESS OF ARBITRATION
A number of traditional service-providers have a virtual lock upon
the transborder arbitration service industry. It is difficult for newcomers
to establish a foothold in the area. There is also intense competition
among the existing institutions for clients.' 32 The American Arbitration
Association (AAA)I 3 3 is the only entity that has made a new institutional
inroad into the business of ICA. Previously, the AAA administered
international arbitrations on a small scale. It has, however, a long-stand-
ing history as a domestic arbitral service-provider. In June 1996, the
AAA created the International Center for Dispute Resolution. Since its
inception, the Center has administered more than 1,000 cases, and its
annual caseload is approaching 400 cases.' 34 In 2001, the AAA also
opened a European Office of the International Arbitration Center in
Dublin, Ireland. The Irish International Arbitration Centre represents
the AAA's second institutional incursion into the highly territorialist
domain of ICA.'35 It is too early to determine whether the second ven-
ture is likely to be as successful as the first.
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), 3 6 headquartered
132. See generally David Hacking, A New Competition-Rivals for Centres of Arbitration, 45
ARBITRATION 166 (1979).
133. See Robert Coulson, American Arbitration Association, in ICCA, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
TWELFTH INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CONGRESS 223 (1994); Paul Friedland, Arbitration under
the AAA's Rules, 6 ARB. INT'L 301 (1990); Michael F. Hoellering, AAA Administration of
International Arbitration Proceedings, 13 ICSID REv.-FOR. INVEST. L.J. 51 (1998); Michael F.
Hoellering, How to Draft an AAA Arbitration Clause for International Business, 47 ARE. J. 44
(1992); Michael F. Hoellering, International Arbitration Under U.S. Law and AAA Rules, 50 DISP.
RES. J. 25 (1995); Michael F. Hoellering & Bette E. Shifman, American Arbitration Association,
in WORLD ARB. REP. 5647 (1989); Francoise Joly, Le Rdglement d'Arbitrage International de
I'Association Amenricaine d'Arbitrage, 1993 REV. ARB. 401; Robert Meade, Arbitration Overview:
The AAA's Role in Domestic and International Arbitration, I J. INT'L ARB. 263 (1984).
134. See AAA Center Adninisters its 1O00th International Case, 10 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP.
149 (1999).
135. See AAA Will Open International Center for Dispute Resolution in Dublin, 12 WORLD
ARB. & MED. REP. 177 (2001).
136. See W. CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION (3d ed.
1999); INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, SIXTY YEARS OF
ICC ARBITRATION: A LOOK AT THE FUTURE (1984); Jean-Jacques Arnaldez, Un Centre
International: La Chambre de Commerce Internationale, 1980 REV. ARB. 249; Leonard B.
Bannicke, International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration, 23 ALBERTA L. REV. 51
(1985); Andr6 Boissier & Rend Arnaud, Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of
Commerce, 3 ARB. J. 109 (1939); Jean-Franqois Bourque, l'Expirience du Centre International
d'Expertise de la CCI et le Diveloppement de l'Expertise Internationale, 1995 REV. ARB. 231;
Yves Ddrains, International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration, 5 PACE L. REV. 591 (1985); Yves
D1rains, The Future of ICCArbitration, 14 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 437 (1980); Michel Gaudet, The
Ilternational Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration, 4 INT'L TAX & BUS. LAW. 213 (1986);
Samuel V. Goekjian, ICC Arbitration from a Practitioner's Perspective, 14 J. INT'L L. & ECON.
407 (1980); Richard J. Graving, The International Arbitration Institutions: How Good a Job Are
They Doing?, 4 AM. UNIV. J. INT'L L. & POL. 319 (1989); Tila Maria de Hancock, The ICC Court
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in Paris, France, is the most well-established and well-known interna-
tional arbitral institution. Despite recent attempts to lower costs,137 ICC
arbitration remains the most expensive form of transborder arbitration.
The ICC provides highly professional arbitration services. Given its
long-standing presence in the field, some international lawyers (with or
without ties to the ICC) maintain that ICC arbitral awards have greater
credibility before national courts than awards from other arbitral institu-
tions. They believe that a stronger presumption of enforceability
attaches to ICC awards on a worldwide basis. Be that as it may, the ICC
has administered more than 5,000 arbitrations since the late 1920s.138 It
administers approximately 500 arbitrations annually, and usually these
arbitrations represent very significant cases in terms of the amount in
dispute and the stature of the parties.
The London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) 39 is also an
important entity in the provision of arbitration services to international
commercial parties. It, too, is an experienced service-provider and bene-
fits from an impeccable professional reputation. Because it charges an
hourly rate rather than a fee based on a percentage of the amount in
controversy, 140 LCIA arbitration is much less expensive than ICC arbi-
tration. The LCIA, however, does less business than the ICC-approxi-
mately, 150 cases per year. 4 ' The LCIA Rules of Arbitration are more
accessible than their ICC counterpart, which seems to be mired in the
franglais foibles of French-to-English translation and composition. His-
torically, among international lawyers, LCIA arbitration has been per-
ceived as English arbitration and linked to English court supervision of
the merits of arbitral awards. The organization added "international" to
its corporate title and created a number of regional councils throughout
the world to alter this perception. That effort, however, has met with
of Arbitration: The Institution and Its Procedures, 1 J. INT'L ARB. 21 (1984); Jan Paulsson, The
Contemporary Role of ICC Arbitration in Resolving International Business Disputes, 9 INT'L
TRADE L. & PRAC. 323 (1983); Eric A. Schwartz, Arbitration Under the Rules of the International
Chamber of Commerce, 1993 ARB. & DirP. REs. L. J. 130; J. Gettis Wetter, The Present Status of
the International Court of Arbitration of the ICC: An Appraisal, I AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 91
(1990).
137. See Stephen Bond, The 1986 Reform of ICC's Practice Relating to Costs and Payments, 2
ARB. INT'L 358 (1986).
138. Lecture by Lorraine Brennan, North American Director, ICC Court of Arbitration, July
30, 2002, McGill University Law Faculty.
139. See HANDBOOK OF ARBITRATION PRACTICE (R. Bernstein & D. Woods eds., 2d ed. 1993);
W. Lawrence Craig, Rules of the London Court of International Arbitration, 55 ARBITRATION 33
(1989); Delvolv6, La Centenaire de la LCIA, 1993 REV. ARB. 599; Sir Michael Kerr, London
Court ofInternationalArbitration 1892-1992, 8 ARE. INT'L 317 (1992); S. W. Lebedev, The LCIA
Rules for International Commercial Arbitration, 8 ARB. INT'L 321 (1992); Kenneth S. Rokison,
The London Court of International Arbitration, 55 ARBITRATION 96 (1989).
140. See Brennan, supra note 138.
141. See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note I, at 33-34.
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only modest success. The 1996 UK Arbitration Act, like its predecessor
in 1979,142 improved England's standing as a venue for transborder arbi-
tration. The further liberalization of English law accompanied by the
tempering of English court supervision of awards have made LCIA arbi-
tration more attractive to commercial parties and given the LCIA a more
noticeable presence in the world marketplace for arbitration services.
Also, there are a number of specialized forms of transborder institu-
tional arbitration. The International Centre for the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes (ICSID) administers arbitrations that involve disputes
between private investors and host states. 143 The objective of ICSID or
World Bank arbitration is to provide a mechanism by which to reduce
the impact of sovereign status upon international investments.'"
ICSID's internal appeal mechanism and other issues, however, rendered
the process ineffective for a time. Only a handful of cases (approxi-
mately thirty) were brought to the ICSID in some thirty-five years of
operation. 145 The reference to ICSID arbitration in the NAFTA Treaty
and in bilateral trade agreements revitalized the process. The ICSID
Secretariat reports that it currently has in excess of sixty pending cases
with many more filings. 146 ICSID administrators are aware of the
rebirth of their process and are seeking to rival the ICC in terms of
transnational prominence. Sovereignty, however, can be an obdurate
and uncompromising barrier that will not necessarily yield to the needs
and objectives of international commerce.
WIPO arbitration 47-arbitrations which involve intellectual prop-
erty disputes performed through the auspices of the World Intellectual
Property Organization-constitutes another specialized form of arbitra-
tion. Despite its direct relevance to globalization and the technological
revolution, WIPO arbitration had not flourished as a form of transborder
arbitration. It began to do a volume of business only when ICANN des-
ignated the WIPO as an arbitration service provider for domain name
disputes. 48 Additionally, a number of local chambers of commerce
142. See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 953-1035; see also Donaldson,
The 1979 Arbitration Act, 45 ARBITRATION 147 (1979); Elland & Goldsmith, The Arbitration Act
1979, 6 INT'L L. & PRAC. 63 (1980).
143. Aron Broches, l'Evolution du C.I.R.D.L., 1979 REV. ARB. 323; Delaume, ICSID
Arbitration, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 23 (J.D.M. Lew ed.,
1986); Paul Szbsz, Arbitration Under the Auspices of the World Bank, 3 INT'L LAW. 312 (1969);
see also M. HIRSCH, THE ARBITRATION MECHANISM OF THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR THE
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (1993). See generally SMIT & PECHOTA, BIBLIOGRAPHY,
supra note 14, at 91-99.
144. See generally SMIT & PECHOTA, BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 14, at 91-99.
145. See id.
146. See generally 9 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 150 (1998).
147. See generally SMIT & PECHOTA, BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 14, at 120-21.
148. See generally II WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 71 (2000).
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administer transborder arbitrations. The Zurich Chamber of Com-
merce,' 49 for example, has its own set of arbitration rules and actively
seeks to administer arbitral proceedings. The Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce 5 ° is another case in point, illustrating both the function and
adaptability of these organizations.
During the cold war era, Sweden played a vital role in ICA by
acting as the principal center for holding East-West arbitrations. 15 1 In
fact, a sophisticated group of lawyers and other experts had developed in
Stockholm to address the special problems associated with these arbitra-
tions. When the cold war ended and China developed CIETAC arbitra-
tion, "'52 the need for a venue specializing in East-West arbitrations was
diminished considerably. In 1999, the Swedish Parliament enacted the
Swedish Arbitration Act 153 to modernize the Swedish law of arbitration
and to sustain and redirect Sweden's reputation as an attractive venue
for international arbitrations. The enactment of the law demonstrated
that Sweden was attempting to find its role in the refashioned interna-
tional commercial order.
The Swedish Arbitration Institute (the "Institute") revised its arbi-
tration rules in light of the new law. The Institute was established in
1949 and is part of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, and partici-
pates in a long tradition of Swedish arbitration. It is a very active arbi-
tral institution, receiving more than 120 new cases in 1998.114 The
revision of the rules is not radical in character; the rules came into force
in 1988 and exemplified a modern regulation of arbitration. The amend-
ments reinforce the objective of achieving procedural economy and flex-
ibility. For example, the stated time-limit for the rendition of an award
has been reduced from one year to six months.'55 The time-limit begins
to run from the date of the arbitral tribunal's constitution. The Institute
can grant extensions. 56 While the shortened time-limit is unrealistic for
complex arbitrations, it does symbolize the Institute's commitment to
expedited dispute resolution through arbitration. The revised rules also
authorize arbitrators to issue interim awards for the production of evi-
dence and to secure the enforcement of final awards. 157 While such
measures are subject to judicial enforcement, their availability makes
149. See generally SMIT & PECHOTA, BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 14, at 148.
150. See generally SMIT & PECHOTA, BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 14, at 134-35.
151. The author adapted the following commentary and description from his previous work.
See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 1038-40.
152. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
153. See Sigvard Jarvin, La Nouvelle Loi Suddoise sur l'Arbitrage, 2000 REV. ARB. 27.
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clear that Institute rules are meant to foster the effectiveness of
arbitration.
The revised rules also emphasize the international character of non-
domestic arbitration. For example, when the parties to an international
arbitration do not provide for a law governing the merits, the Institute
rules state that the arbitral tribunal can choose to apply a specific
national law or "rules of law" it finds suitable.' 58 The latter category
can include transborder laws like The United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 159 the UNIDROIT
"Principles of International Commercial Contracts,"' 160 or the lex mer-
catoria arbitralis.'6 ' This is a particularly significant emendation and
represents a strong position in favor of arbitral autonomy and arbitrator
authority.
Finally, the revised Institute rules have altered the manner in which
arbitrator compensation is determined. The prior practice allowed the
arbitral tribunal to determine its own fees.' 6 2 In order to promote greater
predictability in arbitrator fees, the revised rules provide that the fees
will be set by the Institute in accordance with the amount in dispute. 63
The applicable schedule will include minimum and maximum amounts
to allow the Institute to take the characteristics of the particular arbitra-
tion into account. Arbitrator fees will be paid at the outset of the pro-
ceedings, along with administrative fees.
The issue of arbitrator fees has become a problematic aspect of the
business of transborder arbitration. 64  It is generally known that the
going rate for ICC and other international arbitrators is (US) $600/hour
or (US) $5,000/day. It is also generally acknowledged that it is very
difficult to break into the group of international arbitrators and that the
158. See id.
159. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)
(April 11, 1980), U.N. Doc. A/CoNF 97/18, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 671 (1980).
160. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW ("UNIDROIT"),
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (1994) [hereinafter UNIDROIT
Principles]. See Michael Joachim Bonell, UNIDROIT Principles and the Lex Mercatoria, in
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION, supra note 4, at 249.




164. See Jacques Werner, Remuneration of Arbitrators by the International Chamber of
Commerce, 5 J. INT'L ARB. 135 (1988). See also Alan W. Shilston, The Evolution of Modern
Commercial Arbitration, 4 J. INT'L ARB. 45 (1987); Hans Smit, The Future of International
Commercial Arbitration, 2 WEST'S INT'L L. BULL. 5 (1984); John Uff, Cost-Effective Arbitration,
59 ARBITRATION 31 (1993). See generally M. O'REILLY, COSTS IN ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS
(1995). See also John Yukio Gotanda, Setting Arbitrators' Fees: An International Survey, 33
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 779 (2000).
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contract of appointment is the only source of arbitrator certification
other than the arbitrators' professional activity and training. The "club-
bish" atmosphere and the insularity of the group already detract from the
legitimacy of the process. The enormous fees that can be commanded
by international arbitrators place further pressure on the process. Arbi-
trators, unregulated except by contract, develop a monetary self-interest
that can conflict with both the ethical and practical operation of the pro-
cess. The exorbitant fees also could eventually deter commercial parties
from having recourse to the arbitral process. The Swedish Institute's
regulation of this aspect of the process-separate from the contract, the
parties, and the arbitrators-appears to be a step in the right direction.
THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY
Certain aspects of ICA's development have parallels in the elabora-
tion of the domestic United States' law of arbitration. For example, both
forms of arbitration have demonstrated a critical need for uniformity in
their governing legal provisions. Uniformity was achieved in the
domestic United States arbitration law through federalization. Begin-
ning with Prima Paint,165 continuing into the second trilogy cases
(Moses Cone,'66 Keating,'67 and Byrd),'68 and ending with the opinion
in Terminix v. Dobson169 (all of this development being prophetically
announced years earlier by Judge Medina in Robert Lawrence),7 ° it
became clear that the United States or Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)'
was the governing law of arbitration in the United States. In these
landmark cases, the United States Supreme Court decided that federal
courts sitting in diversity were, despite the Erie doctrine,' 72 bound to
apply the FAA, that state court decisions also were subject to the FAA,
and that state legislatures could not deviate from the provisions and prin-
ciples of the FAA in enacting regulatory frameworks that applied
directly or indirectly to arbitration. 173 As long as interstate commerce
was somehow implicated, a suitable jurisdictional basis existed for the
application of federal law and the FAA would govern. "[S]tate law to
the contrary"'174 was preempted by the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution.
165. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
166. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1 (1982).
167. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
168. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
169. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
170. Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabric, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959).
171. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
172. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
173. See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 121-98.
174. See Dobson, 513 U.S. at 272-73, 280.
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The federal preemption doctrine made it possible to elaborate a uni-
form American law of arbitration. The Court pursued the federalization
policy as single-mindedly as it would later seek to protect arbitration
agreements from challenges based on matters of contract formation.
Rightly or wrongly, the Court endeavored to elaborate a law free of the
wrinkle of exceptions. It seemed to believe that, once established,
exceptions would eventually come to rule the legal propositions from
which they emerged and would invite ever more litigation-in this set-
ting, about the operation of a framework meant to curtail the volume of
judicial adjudication. No economy of judicial resources would be
achieved and access to adjudication would be reduced by the burden-
some character of the process. Despite its susceptibility to criticism,
there was undeniable wisdom in the Court's position. The dynamic of
judicial decision-making tends to seek exceptions to general proposi-
tions. Once elaborated, these exceptions take on a life of their own and,
almost inevitably, engulf the rule from which they emerged. This is true
even in the decisional law of highly-regarded courts. The grounds for
achieving the vacatur of awards illustrates the problem.' 75
The text of section 10 of the FAA' 7 6 eliminates, by implication, the
possibility that arbitral awards can be subject to judicial review on the
merits for purposes of vacatur or confirmation. The statutory grounds
listed in section 10 restrict the judicial supervision of awards to circum-
stances in which the proceeding that gave rise to the award was cor-
rupted by outside influences, arbitrator abuse of authority, or resulted in
a failure of basic fairness (notice and an opportunity to be heard).
Because of an apparent inability to distinguish between labor and com-
mercial arbitration, the courts in their decisional law added several non-
statutory grounds to the foregoing list. These grounds all involved
vacating awards for errors made by labor arbitrators in applying the law
of the labor agreement (the collective bargaining agreement) or of the
workplace or for misassessing the record of the matter. 77 The strong
presumption of enforceability that attached to arbitral awards through
the statute now had two types of exceptions-statutorily-established and
common-law grounds. Moreover, the integration of the common-law
grounds into the statutory framework had the effect eventually of
allowing courts to revisit the merits of the case and to reverse the award
on the basis of the court's disagreement with the arbitrator's application
of law or reasoning on the law. In a word, the incorporation of com-
175. The foregoing analysis relies on CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 121-
98.
176. The foregoing analysis relies on CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 489-
536.
177. See id. at 499-516.
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mon-law exceptions conflicted with the statute by allowing courts to
engage in a merits review of awards-a process forbidden by the
enacted legislation. Although the judicial policy favoring arbitration
minimized the possibility that the merits review of awards would ever
become the standard practice, cases appeared in which court disagree-
ment with the arbitrator's disposition of the matter resulted in the vaca-
tur of the award.178 The development of such accidents explains, to
some degree, the Court's unwillingness to tolerate exceptions to the
basic principles of its arbitration doctrine.
World courts achieved the same degree of uniformity in ICA under
a different name. "Internationalization" performed the function that
"federalization" had satisfied in the domestic law of arbitration. Interna-
tionalization, in effect, created a unitary law for ICA among the highly
diverse countries and legal systems of the world community. This single
standard approach blocked the creation of national legal obstacles to
ICA and made "a-national" or non-national-law-controlled arbitration a
reality.179 In effect, it prevented the erosion of ICA by eliminating
national law variations and legal disparities. Unitary rules, implemented
by courts with the discipline of consistency and predictability, appeared
to be necessary to arbitral systems in both the transborder and domestic
level.
IMPACT ON NATIONAL LAW
The creation and establishment of a system of ICA has had a num-
ber of consequences upon domestic legal systems. Representing a pro-
gressive use of law to accomplish practical ends, ICA filled a void
where the ordinary process of legality, paralyzed by conflicts, had failed
to provide any solution. In terms of municipal court activity, the impli-
cations were several.18 Court dockets would include fewer litigations
involving international transactions. Choice-of-law or conflicts analysis
would play a far lesser role in this area of dispute resolution. Arbitra-
tors, in general, would probably be less concerned than judges about the
flawless selection of the governing law and the correct application and
interpretation of its provisions. Moreover, arbitrator determinations
were private rulings and ordinarily memorialized sparingly in scant legal
reasoning. As support for ICA grew, the central focus of international
litigation before municipal courts was altered. It was no longer devoted
to renvoi, proof of foreign law, discovery conducted abroad, the extra-
territorial assertion of judicial jurisdiction, and the enforcement of for-
178. See id.
179. See infra text accompanying notes 182-83.
180. The following analysis relies on CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 2-5.
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eign judgments. Rather, the preoccupation shifted to the enforcement of
international arbitral agreements and awards. To a large extent, legalis-
tic considerations ceded their dominant position in the adjudicatory hier-
archy to arbitration and the provision of workable business solutions.
Arbitration agreements eliminated the possible conflict of jurisdictions;
arbitrator discretion minimized the possible conflict of laws; and the
enforcement framework under the New York Arbitration Convention' 8'
dispelled possible conflicts of judgments.
National law itself appeared to play a very subdued role in the pro-
cess of transborder arbitration. Under the theory of "a-national" arbitra-
tion, "'82 noted above, 83 courts at all stages of the arbitral process would
apply transnational norms exclusively in their supervision of transborder
arbitral agreements, proceedings, and awards. The local law of arbitra-
tion (the lex loci arbitri) had no impact upon the process except to the
extent that its provisions coincided with the transnational norms on arbi-
tration and could have a positive bearing on the process. Those transna-
tional norms greatly favored the arbitral process and its operation. They
established a nearly irrebuttable presumption of enforceability in all
matters affecting transborder arbitration. Moreover, national courts
were expected to use their authority exclusively to assist (and not to
hinder) the conduct of international arbitral proceedings and to achieve
the enforcement of awards. The situs for the arbitration is usually
selected because it is neutral as to the parties and the transaction that
underlies the dispute. The application of non-local legal standards in
such circumstances is understandable and rationally justified.
The tenets of "a-national" arbitration, nevertheless, further require
that courts at the place of enforcement also apply transnational norms on
arbitration. In these circumstances, the award-unlike the arbitral pro-
ceeding-will (if enforced) become a legally-binding determination in
the place of enforcement and will have an economic impact upon a resi-
dent or citizen of the requested jurisdiction. "A-national" arbitration,
therefore, mandates a complete sublimation of the national law and
interest to the necessary discipline for arbitration in order for the state to
reap the long-term benefits of the international arbitral process.
LAW AND LEGITIMACY
Generally, the type of justice that is available in ICA is not the
elaborate form of "designer justice" that applies in domestic United
181. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
182. The following analysis relies on CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 22-
24. See also Hans Smit, A-National Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 629 (1989).
183. See supra text accompanying note 179.
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States' legal proceedings. Rights protection, procedural sophistication,
and an uncompromising commitment to due process are not the
hallmarks of ICA. In fact, "designer justice" and the complex conflicts
that attend the operation of the legal process are some of the principal
reasons for the success of non-judicial adjudicatory processes like arbi-
tration. Protracted proceedings and the expense of litigation have made
judicial justice inaccessible. In ICA, functionality is the foremost objec-
tive along with finality and basic fairness. Rights protection does not
supercede these objectives. ICA, however, is neither a simplistic nor an
arbitrary process. It is not "justice under a tree." Succinctly stated, ICA
(like its domestic counterpart) is a process of adjudication that is acces-
sible, expert, reasonably fair, and professional-the results of which are
enforceable. In the international context, it is important to note further
that ICA is neutral as to nationality and legal tradition. ICA is the prod-
uct of party choice, of the parties' exercise of their freedom of contract.
In an imperfect and difficult world, it is a realistic and meaningful alter-
native which provides a remedy where one would not otherwise be
available.
What role, if any, does the law play in regard to ICA-its opera-
tions, and its adjudicatory determinations? At a domestic level, law
embodies social and political forces that invest public institutions with
authority and legitimacy. It acquires its legitimating function from its
origins in democratic processes established by the originating political
framework. In the international setting, law does not arise from the
same source, have the same content, or perform the same functions.
International law is not domestic law and vice versa. The lack of
equivalency does not debilitate or detract from either form of law.
Domestic law and its foundation in democratic values are not the be-all
and end-all of law. International law can stand on its own as law.
In the international arena, no political state in the domestic sense
exists; authority vests in a group of "equal" sovereigns. Law interna-
tionally often arises from customary practices or the development of a
consensus view among states. There is a great deal of fluidity and indef-
initeness about international law-making. It is more de lege ferenda
than lex. International agreements and treaties often have an aspirational
(rather than rule-making) quality. The dictates of sovereignty dilute
both the statutory and decisional rule of law. The civilizing influence of
law often is secondary to the prospective and actual use of force in state-
to-state relations. Acceptance of a practice by powerful states often
amounts to the conferral of legitimacy. Majoritarian rule is not the guid-
ing principle. Politics and power are the more usual watchwords of
international relations.
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National law rules could be used to regulate ICA according to a
rigorous domestic policy. The implementation of such a regime would
represent a return to a bygone era of legal hostility to arbitration. Statu-
tory provisions and court rulings would become vehicles for imposing
restraints on the ICA process. Such restrictions could be selective or
comprehensive, and could contain a wide variety of grounds and express
numerous policy objectives. The regulations would not exist to conse-
crate the parties' right to engage in arbitration, but rather to make clear
that the provision of adjudicatory services is a state function and prerog-
ative. Only the state can derogate from its own authority and responsi-
bilities in the area. The purpose of legislation on arbitration would be to
regulate the limited incursion arbitration can make into the state's privi-
leged domain. Such a regime would probably include a statutory state-
ment on subject matter inarbitrability, articulate a more aggressive
policy on the judicial supervision of awards, and restrict arbitration's
scope of application. Domestic law would surrender none of its real
authority to the private process. ICA would function through and for the
benefit of domestic law. Present-day realities preclude such a regulatory
approach to arbitration. A highly restrictive policy is both impractical
and impolitic. A departure from the highly tolerant and liberalist trans-
border regulation of ICA is unlikely to be achieved simply through a
radical reversal of position.
Domestic law does not invest the process of ICA with legitimacy.
There is an interface with domestic law for purposes of gaining assis-
tance for arbitral tribunals and proceedings, establishing decisional pred-
icates, and pursuing the coercive enforcement of awards. A national
statute on arbitration usually recognizes and upholds ICA and governs a
number of other matters that relate to the ICA process: (1) the capacity
of the parties to contract (and, relatedly, of arbitrators to act as arbitra-
tors); (2) the validity (and enforceability) of arbitration agreements; (3)
the relationship between the court system and the arbitral process (in
terms of attachment or other forms of interim relief, the appointment of
arbitrators, compelling parties to arbitrate or to cooperate with the pro-
cess, and the like); and (4) the judicial supervision of awards in the event
of noncompliance (grounds for confirmation or vacatur, severance and
partial confirmation of awards, resubmission of defective awards to the
arbitral tribunal, enforcement and non-enforcement).
Domestic law, therefore, hardly drives ICA. The description of "a-
national" arbitration 184 makes clear that national law does not provide
ICA with its doctrinal anchor. The legal foundation for ICA arises from
a universal principle of private law: freedom of contract (party auton-
184. See supra text accompanying notes 182-83.
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omy for civil law lawyers). According to landmark court decisions,
international instruments, statutory provisions, and institutional rules,
the contracting parties have a nearly unqualified right to engage in arbi-
tration and to establish the modalities of their arbitration. The United
States Supreme Court is fond of stating that courts "enforce arbitration
agreements as they are written."' 85 It also intones with equal frequency
the view that a particular arbitration is a "one-off' event devoid of larger
systemic consequences. 86 In other words, there is no need for a rule of
law where contract controls and privatizes all aspects of the dispute res-
olution process. By emphasizing the sovereignty of contract rights and
the self-contained character of arbitration, the Court suggests that statu-
tory frameworks, transnational or otherwise, are merely "default" vehi-
cles that fill gaps when party agreement is absent, unclear, or impossible
to secure.
Law in ICA, therefore, is the universal law of contract. There also
is law-making in arbitration from a stare decisis or jurisprudence itablie
perspective. Arbitral rulings yield legal principles or rules that can be
applied as controlling in subsequent arbitrations. International arbitra-
tors not only adjudicate, but they also can and do make law-a lex mer-
catoria arbitralis.'87 Moreover, practices pertaining to the regulation of
arbitration and the conduct of arbitral proceedings have been codified in
the UNCITRAL model framework. The Model Law and the Model Rules,
as noted earlier, 188 reflect a general world consensus regarding the
essential principles of arbitration law and of the rules pertaining to the
arbitral trial.
A laissez-faire state policy in conjunction with universal contract
law principles and the codification of basic regulatory principles through
international instruments constitute the legal foundation for the process
of ICA. These elements coincide with the development of "a-national"
arbitration and the law-making function of international arbitrators. The
autonomy of the contracting parties is so strong as a controlling proposi-
tion that some national courts permit the parties to agree to their own
standard of judicial review for awards. 8 9 The party choice may conflict
with an otherwise governing statutory standard, but some courts will
enforce it nonetheless. While this position has been criticized and has
185. See, e.g., Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
186. See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
187. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
189. For a description and discussion of the so-called opt-in provisions for judicial review, see
CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 219-24.
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divided ruling courts, 9 ° when applied, it makes the governing statute
into a default framework. The enforcement of awards nullified at the
place of rendition is another illustration of the perfunctory status of
national law in ICA. 9' Courts in both France and the United States
have enforced awards set aside at the place of rendition. 92 Again,
despite its controversial character, this decisional law demonstrates that
national law is subservient to the transborder norms that attach to the
ICA process. The enforceability of awards trumps the integrity and
authority of national legal processes.
INDETERMINANT EMBRYONIC RULES
ICA represents a functional adjudicatory process for the resolution
of civil, commercial, and even regulatory disputes that arise in interna-
tional commercial transactions. ICA is not a static process. Its design
and operation are not etched in stone. It tolerates adjustments. In fact,
as the process grows and develops, its gravamen should be revisited.
While autonomy and independence remain instrumental to the pro-
cess, current statutory and decisional-rule predicates are characterized
by an inadequacy of content. They simply do not provide a sufficient
response to the growing complexity of the process. Rules can be, have
been, and are adjusted, expanded, narrowed, and sometimes mutilated to
provide governing propositions for practical circumstances. The content
of existing rules explodes and their structure shatters when they are
applied to the issues that surface currently in the process. Because they
have not been adapted to arbitration's expanded scope of application and
growing significance, the rules of present-day arbitration law are merely
embryonic statements of a possible regulatory predicate. Two examples
from contemporary law illustrate the point.
First, the indeterminacy of the rules of contemporary arbitration
law is illustrated by the history and present-day application of the "man-
ifest disregard of the law" ground for the vacatur of arbitral awards. 193
This provision could affect an international arbitral award in a setting
aside action under Article V of the New York Arbitration Convention.' 94
The very origins of the rule are murky and unsettled. It is the received
wisdom among courts and commentators that "manifest disregard" first
appeared in Wilko v. Swan 95 when the Court stated: "In unrestricted
190. See, e.g., Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501 (7th
Cir. 1991).
191. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
192. Id.
193. See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note I, at 509-16.
194. See Yosul'Ahmed Alghamin & Sons v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 1997).
195. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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submissions, such as the present margin agreements envisage, the inter-
pretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard
are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in inter-
pretation." 96 This delphic pronouncement is generally acknowledged to
constitute the first trace of the expression. 97
Thematically, given its content, the expression appears to fit into
and make sense principally (perhaps exclusively) in the context of labor
arbitration. In fact, "manifest disregard of the law" appears to have
actually originated there and to have been a means by which courts
could police a labor arbitrator's fidelity to the provisions of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement (CBA). The case law on labor arbitration
makes clear that the CBA constitutes the law for the workplace and is
often referred to by parties and courts as the contract. 198 Labor arbitra-
tors are required to stay within the four corners of the CBA, and are not
authorized "to dispense [their] own brand of industrial justice": "[their]
award[s] [are] legitimate only as long as [they] draw [their] essence
from the collective bargaining agreement."' 99
In this setting, manifest disregard of the law meant that the labor
arbitrator had gone beyond the CBA or contract, and attempted "to dis-
pense his own brand of industrial justice."200 Such a situation did not
arise frequently. Labor arbitrators have a rather wide latitude of inter-
pretation because "the industrial common law-the practices of the
industry and the shop-is equally a part of the collective bargaining
agreement although [it is] not expressed in it." 0' The regulatory provi-
sions governing labor arbitration, however, needed to establish clearly
the point at which the arbitrator ceased to exercise legitimate authority.
The process of industrial self-governance could not tolerate individually-
created, capricious, or irrational labor arbitrator determinations that had
no bearing to the CBA or relationship with the law of the shop.
In addition, the federal circuits were split on whether "manifest dis-
regard of the law" was part of the law of the individual circuits. The
ground is recognized in the District of Columbia, the First, Second,
Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. 20 2 As noted earlier,20 3 it is a common-
law ground for vacatur grafted onto the FAA by court construction-"a
196. Id. at 436-37.
197. See Rodriguez v. Prudential-Bache Secs., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 1202, 1209 (D.P.R. 1995).
198. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
199. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
200. Id.
201. See Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 574.
202. See I. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW, Agreements, Awards, and Remedies
under the Federal Arbitration Act, §§ 40.7.1, 40:83 (Supp. 1999).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 176-78.
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judicially created standard for vacating an arbitration award ..... 0 It
permits the otherwise unlawful review of the merits of awards. It was
recently expanded by the Second Circuit to include arbitrator disregard
of the facts and evidence presented, thereby allowing it to act as an even
broader basis for the judicial supervision of the merits of awards.2 °5
Despite its notoriety in the area, there is little agreement among
courts as to what the phrase means or when it is to be implemented.
Some courts assert that it cannot be applied without finding a breach of a
statutory ground;20 6 others contend that it can only be applied when arbi-
trators issue reasons with their awards; 20 7 yet other courts maintain vari-
ously that it requires clear arbitrator recognition of the applicable law,20 8
a determination by the arbitrator that the law is applicable and clear,20 9
or that there be a legal error that is discoverable and evident to the "aver-
age reasonable arbitrator" ("capable of being readily and instantly per-
ceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator"). 10
Also, "[t]he governing-law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitra-
tors must be well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable." '' Despite
the "thickness" of its doctrinal fabric, 12 courts generally conclude
(somewhat ironically) that vacatur on this basis should be rare: "Judicial
inquiry under the 'manifest disregard' standard is ... extremely limited
... . We are not at liberty to set aside an arbitration panel's award
because of an arguable difference regarding the meaning or applicability
of laws urged upon it ....23 Finally, one court has deemed the formu-
lation to be empty rhetoric: "We understand neither the need for the
formula nor the role it plays in judicial review of arbitration (we suspect
none-that it is just words)." '214
The current rule, therefore, is a patchwork of interpretations and
shifting applications of the doctrine. There is uncertainty about whether
the rule should continue to exist and what its function is, might be, or
ought to be. There is some speculation that it could find a new vocation
by allowing the courts to supervise arbitrator determinations on statutory
claims, especially in domestic employment matters that implicate civil
204. Fine v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 765 F. Supp. 824, 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
205. Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998).
206. See Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 1991).
207. See Rodriguez v. Prudential-Bache Secs., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 1202, 1209 (D.P.R. 1995).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See Fine v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 765 F. Supp. 824, 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir.
1986).
214. See Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994).
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rights.21 5 In any event, as it operates currently, the rule provides little
guidance and predictability. It does present the prospect of surprise or
of further mutations in content and application. If misapplied, it could
wreak havoc with the autonomy of arbitral determinations and awards.
Second, more germane to ICA, the crucial issue of the role of sov-
ereign status in arbitration remains largely unsettled. There is a
hodgepodge of decisional and statutory positions, but no clearly enforce-
able rule that would close the transactional "black hole" left open by
sovereign immunity. An indirect answer to the sovereignty question is
contained in the long-standing legal doctrines of assumption of risk and
caveat emptor. If a party entered into dealings with a sovereign entity, it
did so knowingly and at its own peril. If the exercise of sovereign dis-
cretion left the party completely in the lurch, it could blame no one but
itself. The ICSID framework21 6 attempts to attenuate the harshness of
that rule and result. There is, however, no guarantee available but for an
abstract undertaking in a treaty that applies to the enforcement of an
ICSID award. As noted earlier,2 7 NAFTA provides the most effective
discipline of sovereign positions when private parties complain about
sovereign behavior. In the United States, legislators endeavored to fash-
ion some domestic statutory answers to the problem of sovereignty.
They incorporated them into the domestic law on arbitration and other
related legislation. 21  These solutions, however, are not a comprehen-
sive answer to the multiple issues raised by the problem.
In 1988, in response to a number of court rulings, the United States
Congress modified the impact of sovereignty upon the enforcement of
international arbitration awards. To achieve its objective, Congress
enacted legislation which amended the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976 (FSIA) as well as the FAA.2t 9 The language of the amend-
ments diminished, to some degree, the likelihood that sovereign status
could be used in certain circumstances to block the enforcement of arbi-
tral awards rendered against states.
Prior to Public Law No. 100-669, under the FSIA, a party who
sought to enforce an arbitral award against a state or state party could
only invoke the implied waiver exception to sovereign immunity under
215. See, e.g., Arbitrator's Error of Law Not Grounds for Reversing Award for Punitive
Damages, 8 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 222 (1997).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 143-46.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 32-36.
218. See text infra at notes 219-27.
219. See H.R. Rep. No. 100-824 (1990); 134 CONG. REC. S13966 (Sept. 26, 1988); 134 CONG.
REC. H6484, H6485 (Aug. 8, 1988).
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section 1605(a)(1) of the legislation.220 By agreeing to arbitrate, the
state had acceded to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal and thereby
arguably made itself vulnerable to the eventual judicial enforcement of
an arbitral award. While some courts subscribed to the latter view,22
other courts took a different position. They held that "an agreement to
arbitrate in an [sic] foreign country, without more, ought not to operate
as a waiver of sovereign immunity in United States courts ... "222 This
split of position created substantial uncertainty for the contracting
parties.
The enactment of Public Law No. 100-669 was intended to clarify
this situation by amending the FSIA to include new section 1605(a)(6).
Under that provision, states simply were not immune from the assertion
of judicial jurisdiction in legal proceedings in which a party sought to
enforce an arbitral agreement or award. 2 3 The "arbitration exception"
to state judicial immunity applied in a variety of possible circumstances:
(1) when the situs of the arbitration was or was intended to be in the
United States; (2) when the New York Arbitration Convention or
another international accord (e.g., the ICSID Convention, the Algiers
Accord, or the UNCITRAL arbitral framework) governed or could gov-
ern the arbitral agreement or award; (3) when United States courts
would have had jurisdiction over the matter but for the arbitration agree-
ment; or (4) when section 1605(a)(1) (express or implied waiver of
immunity) "is otherwise applicable. 224
The law also added section 15 on the act of state doctrine to the
FAA. 22' This provision was drafted and enacted in response to the deci-
sion in Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
220. See D. EPSTEIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, § 7.10, at 7-67 (1998).
221. See Transp. Wiking Trader Schiffarhtsgesellschaft MBH & Co. Kommanditgesellschaft v.
Navimpex Centrala Navala, 989 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that, when Navimpex agreed to
arbitrate and actually took part in an arbitration pursuant to the agreement, "as an instrumentality
or agency of the Romanian Government-a signatory to the Convention-it had to have
contemplated the involvement of the courts of any of the Contracting States in an action to enforce
the award").
222. See Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980).
223. See H.R. Rep. No. 100-824 (1990); 134 CONG. REC. S13966 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1988);
134 CONG. REc. H6484, H6485 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1988); D. EPSTEIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
LITIGATION, The Foreign Sovereign Inmunities Act, § 7.10, at 7-67 (1998); 1. MAcNEIL ET AL.,
FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW, The FAA and International Arbitration, § 44.9.7.1 (Supp. 1999).
224. See supra note 220. For a recent case applying the exception, see U.S. Titan, Inc. v.
Guangzhou Zhen Hua Shipping Co., 241 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2001).
225. See 1. MAcNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW, The FAA and International
Arbitration, § 44.9.7.2 (Snpp. 1999); D. EPSTEIN CT AL., INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION, The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, § 7.10, at 7-67 (1998); 134 CONG. REC. H10678 (Oct. 20, 1988),
H10678; 134 CONG. REC. S13966 (Sept. 26, 1988); H.R. Rep. No. 100-824 (1990).
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Jamahirya (Liamco).226 In Liamco, the Libyan American Oil Company
had entered into an oil concession contract with the Libyan government.
The contract contained an arbitration agreement. Thereafter, Libya
nationalized the company's assets. The parties disagreed about how the
rate of compensation should be determined; the company wanted the
matter to be determined by arbitration, while Libya asserted that its
nationalization statutes established the compensation rate. Moreover,
Libya refused to appear in the arbitration proceeding that the company
initiated regarding the dispute.227
When the company sought to enforce the award, the court ruled that
the agreement to arbitrate constituted an implied waiver of sovereign
immunity under section 1605(a)(1) of the FSIA.228 Therefore, the court
could have commanded that the parties proceed to arbitration if the con-
cession contract were controlling. The court, however, needed to decide
the more basic issue of whether the contract or the nationalization laws
governed the matter. To do so, in the court's view, required determining
whether the laws were valid enactments. In the court's assessment, such
a determination was precluded by the federal act of state doctrine
because it involved the judicial consideration of foreign government
conduct in the foreign jurisdiction. 9
FAA section 15 was meant to provide a different result in such
circumstances. According to a proponent of the legislation, "the Liamco
decision indicated a need for language clarifying the intent of Congress
with regard to arbitration and the act-of-state doctrine. Clearly, the act-
of-state doctrine should not be used to allow a party to a commercial
relationship to circumvent an agreement to arbitrate disputes. 23°
Despite the availability of international instruments and frame-
works as well as domestic attempts to curtail the impact of sovereignty,
it remains difficult to provide contracting parties with proper advice in
terms of the applicable arbitral law. Section 15 of the FAA appears to
provide some solution to circumstances involving acts of state, but it
may not be clear what constitutes an act of state in either the general or
the specific circumstances of a particular case. The Liamco opinion,
which gave rise to the provision, is hardly transparent or persuasive on
that score. Moreover, why does an act-of-state rule appear in the domes-
tic arbitration law when it relates to international awards and why is it
not part of section 10 when it deals with enforcement? The arbitration




230. 134 CONG. REC. H6484, H6486 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1988) (remarks of Mr. Fish).
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exception to the FSIA is clearer in its meaning and consequences.
Although it expands the breadth of attachable property to state property
unconnected to the dispute, it does not fully resolve the problem of exe-
cution against state assets. Finally, it is conceivable that a court might
find either provision to be an intrusion into the Commander-in-Chief
powers of the Executive and a breach of separation of powers. An une-
quivocal rule, free of salient ambiguities, remains to be elaborated. The
rule predicate here is again inapposite given the magnitude of the inter-
ests involved.
INTERNAL SOVEREIGN CONFLICTS
As ICA develops further, the law (international, domestic, or a mix-
ture of both) may assume the task of resolving the competitive conflicts
among the participants of the process. Law could eliminate such con-
flicts coercively and thereby stabilize the process, enhance its function-
ality, and contribute to its legitimacy. Competitive relationships could
develop among the three major players that have a type of concurrent
sovereign authority in the process: the parties, the arbitrators, and the
administering arbitral institution. Conflicts could develop regarding
whether parties can be forced to comply with an institutional rule with
which they disagree or that they excluded in their reference to arbitra-
tion. For example, institutional rules could mandate that all arbitrators
be equally impartial, while the parties may want to have both a neutral
arbitrator (who would be truly impartial) and party-designated arbitra-
tors (who have an unstated mission of defending or representing the
interests of the designating party in the arbitral deliberations).
Also, could the arbitrators ignore express contract provisions if all
or a majority of them believed that to do so was necessary to the proper
resolution of the matter or in the best interests of the process, or both?
For instance, could they void a contract provision for extensive judicial
review of the merits and replace it with an internal arbitral or more ordi-
nary form of review? Additionally, could an administrating institution
(or, perhaps, a court) force an arbitral tribunal to hear and decide a mat-
ter which the tribunal believed was inarbitrable for reasons of the subject
matter of the dispute or because of the inadequacy or limitations of the
contract? Finally, should such matters be resolved solely within the
arbitral process or should a court have the authority to resolve these
conflicts when they arise or upon petition of one of the parties?
Currently, this type of conflict probably would be resolved by ref-
erence to a tried and true paradigm of basic principles. The latter have a
type of theological standing in the current regulation of the process.
First, the state's laissez-faire approach to arbitration at both the interna-
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tional and domestic level provides for a practice of nearly complete arbi-
tral self-regulation. Courts, therefore, would not be authorized to
intervene except in specific and very narrow circumstances. Second,
there is the strongly-held view in the current process that parties should
trust the arbitrator to reach an appropriate decision in contested matters.
This approach is often relied upon by the institutional administrators of
the process. Accordingly, the arbitrators' exercise of benevolent, all-
knowing discretion should resolve any and all conflicts. Third, the prin-
ciple of party autonomy, which would in these circumstances encourage
the parties to make detailed provisions in their agreement for this type of
eventuality, could provide a solution.
The "basic principles" approach may no longer measure up to the
sophistication of the process, the parties, and the emerging conflicts.
The ideology of trusting the process and its adjudicators "to do the right
thing" and the pragmatic pursuit of functionality may no longer be
potent enough to regulate the power struggles that are likely to develop
in the process. When arbitration was perceived primarily as a means of
avoiding a dysfunctional judicial process at the international or domestic
level, the trading-off of enormous authority and trust in the arbitrator for
a workable process may have been a justifiable bargain. Now that com-
plex matters, significant legal rights, and regulatory interests are impli-
cated and the sources of authority are in potential conflict, the vying for
strategic advantage should be decided by reference to or in accordance
with a more formalized set of principles or procedures and perhaps by an
external decision-maker. The prospect of discarding the basic approach
of the past and the advantages and disadvantages of developing more
juristic rule predicates must now be considered.
A DETAILED ILLUSTRATION
The circumstances of both international and domestic arbitration
illustrate the increased likelihood that sovereign conflicts will emerge in
the arbitral process and require a modification of the current framework
and its practices. Using the facts of the landmark case, Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver,3 ' as a general model, and as a vehicle for responding to
the problem being considered, assume that the parties to the sale and
purchase of trademarks agree that all disputes are to be submitted to ICC
arbitration and that the governing law shall be the UNIDROIT Principles
of International Commercial Contracts (the "UNIDROIT" Principles).232
A dispute arises and the parties proceed to arbitration. In deciding the
231. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
232. See UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 160.
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matter, the arbitrators, however, render a number of questionable
rulings.
For example, the arbitral tribunal rules that the choice-of-law rules
at the situs of the arbitral proceeding or that arise from the parties'
nationality or residence provide for the application of a particular
national law rather than the UNIDROIT Principles. The arbitrators further
state in the award that, in their view, the result would be the same under
either substantive vehicle, but that it is their preference to provide the
parties with a legally correct application of the law in their ruling. Con-
comitantly or alternatively, the arbitral tribunal could conclude that the
UNIDROIT Principles are inapplicable to the resolution of the dispute
because they do not constitute law. Rather, they represent a mere state-
ment or restatement of possible legal principles and are the product of
the efforts of a non-legislative legal organization, the International Insti-
tute for the Unification of Private Law, a working group of which
drafted the UNIDROIT Principles.33 The arbitrators, therefore, determine
that the UNIDROIT Principles are not a proper law for purposes of an
arbitral or any other form of adjudication. In a third variation, the arbi-
tral tribunal rules that the UNIDROIT Principles is the law governing the
merits. In ruling on a dispute, it applies Article 2.3 of the UNIDROIT
Principles to the withdrawal of an offer, but it is clearly the wrong arti-
cle given the facts. The tribunal should have applied Article 2.4 to the
revocation of an offer.
In yet another variation, the tribunal could have simply miscon-
strued the content of the properly applicable provision. For example, the
arbitrators may have misunderstood when an irrevocable offer becomes
revocable under Article 2.3(2). Arbitrator error could also exist when
the arbitrators correctly designate Article 2.4 as the applicable provision,
but apply the civil law view of an offer's irrevocability as the primary
rule rather than as the exception. The text of Article 2.4 clearly indi-
cates that the opposite result should apply.234 The final, additional com-
plication is that an objectively-ascertainable mistake of law may not
make a difference in the result. For instance, it could be the case that,
even if the arbitrators find the wrong party to be liable as a matter of
law, contract defenses might preclude the imposition of liability. It is
also possible that an "objective" error of law leads to the imposition of
monetary liability on the wrong party.
The theology of the "basic principles" approach that governs the
current process could provide the semblance of a response to the forego-
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related principles provide a type of solution: (1) highly limited judicial
supervision of awards; and (2) giving absolute sovereign effect to arbi-
trator rulings. These rules constitute two sides of the same coin: judicial
deference to and the hegemony of the arbitration process. Unless there
is an unspeakably unfair maloccurence in the process, the courts simply
will ratify the arbitrators' determinations. After all, the parties bar-
gained for arbitration and have received-as was their reasonable expec-
tation-both the benefits and disadvantages of the process. The
systemic interests of the process predominate over individual concerns
so that the process may continue to fulfill its necessary role in the trans-
border commercial community.
Moreover, several technical bases in present-day law could be used
to address circumstances in which there is a disparity between party pro-
vision and arbitrator rulings. Whenever such a disparity allegedly exists,
a party could invoke the ground of 'excess of arbitral authority' to chal-
lenge the arbitrators' determination and the enforceability of the award.
A determination regarding whether the UNIDROIT Principles is the appli-
cable law or constitutes a valid form of law could be deemed under
Article V(1)(c) of the New York Arbitration Convention to be "matters
beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration" or, less plausibly
under Article V(1)(d), a facet of "[t]he composition of the arbitral
authority or the arbitral procedure ... not in accordance with the agree-
ment of the parties . . . ." A court might also determine that an award
containing such a ruling is "contrary to the [national] public policy"
because the arbitrators' determination violates the rule of party auton-
omy. Similarly, under the FAA, vacatur of the award could be achieved
under section 10(4) because arguably "the arbitrators exceeded their
powers" in their ruling or on the basis of section 10(3) because the rul-
ing constituted "misbehavior by which the rights" of the parties were
"prejudiced." '235
These technical dispositions are conceivable outcomes because
they uphold the rule of contract in arbitration law. They also represent
the use of court authority to contain the arbitrators' autonomy and the
exercise of their adjudicatory discretion-a result that is much less
palatable under current standards. Vacatur of an arbitral award for an
objection to a choice-of-law ruling could readily be perceived as judicial
interference with the arbitral process. Judicial activism of this sort has
always been seen as antithetical to the interests of the arbitral process.
Finally, even if the award were vacated for these reasons, the technical
basis for the decision might not be stated or could be understated or
235. FAA, § 10(3).
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camouflaged in the court opinion, making it difficult to establish precise
lines of demarcation between the various actors in the process.
NEW RULE PREDICATES
Be that as it may, the time may be ripe-at both the transborder and
domestic levels-to refine the basis for the exercise of judicial supervi-
sion in arbitration and to resolve by statute jurisdictional conflicts that
are likely to emerge in the more developed process. Irreconcilable con-
flict between the sovereign parties can have a profound systemic impact
upon the arbitral process and its operations. To some degree, the critical
question is not whether new rules are necessary but, rather, how they are
to be achieved. The statutory development of more complex rules and
their judicial implementation may place an intolerable or crippling regu-
latory pressure on the process. The rules may be too cumbersome or
may engender a highly complex form of litigation that will significantly
compromise the autonomy and efficient operation of the process.
Events may have simply outdistanced the utility of more efficient mar-
ketplace solutions. An authority mechanism needs to be devised, but its
elaboration must respect the process as well as provide it with a solution
to intractable conflict. A statutory revision seems to be in order, but that
difficult undertaking is fraught with danger.
Initial questions relate to the scope of the contemplated statutory
reform: should the entire statutory framework be revamped; is the revi-
sion of the provision for vacatur or confirmation of awards sufficient; or
would adding a ground to that part of the statute be enough? Relatedly,
what entity should be empowered by the statutory reform to apply the
new standard and what powers should it be granted to accomplish its
task? Other than creating a supranational agency operating through but
beyond domestic processes or entering into a multilateral treaty, it seems
that national courts are the best vehicle for resolving likely authority
conflicts within the transborder arbitral process. The courts possess
binding legal authority, even extraterritorial authority to some degree.
They have no direct interest in the arbitral process, although they may
harbor a view of its worth, mission, or function. They have a fiduciary
obligation to safeguard the public interest. Proceedings are done in pub-
lic and parties are treated in an even-handed and equal way. Generally,
judgments are published or are otherwise accessible to a wider audience
than the litigating parties. Leaving the resolution of authority conflicts
to arbitral institutions, the arbitrators, or the parties would not be a feasi-
ble solution because of their involvement and interest in the process and
because they can become enmeshed in the conflict.
If a court became implicated in a sovereign conflict-say, by corn-
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manding the arbitrators to rule on a matter they believed to be inarbi-
trable-the court in conflict should be disqualified from resolving the
conflicts. In these circumstances, a neutral court might be sought, but a
reference to a court within the same national system might not be
viewed as neutral. Affording jurisdiction to another, nonconflicted arbi-
tral actor would result in the loss of all the advantages associated with
the judicial decision-making process. Referring the conflict to a second,
appellate-type arbitral tribunal might provide the necessary recourse.
Here again, the lack of public authority-despite would-be neutrality-
could be a fatal flaw. It seems that such conflicts should be referred to a
judicial tribunal, but one that is disinterested and manifestly impartial.
A record pertaining to the dispute that describes the parties
involved, the relevant facts, and the issue itself is necessary to make the
new type of judicial function possible. This would require-as a general
practice-some documentary work on the part of arbitral institutions
and tribunals. At a minimum, arbitrators would be required to render a
detailed reasoning with awards, i.e., the award should supply the court
with a reasonably thorough statement of the facts of the case, a descrip-
tion of the issues submitted to arbitration, a summary of the parties'
positions on these issues, and, finally, the arbitral tribunal's determina-
tion and the justification for the result in terms of applicable law. This
practice would formalize the process and give it a bureaucratic character
that it currently does not possess. Time and resources would need to be
dedicated to this activity. Presumably, the writing of the award would
not be subject to adversarial argument.
In an indirect way, the present-day process imposes a similar
requirement whenever a party challenges the enforceability of an arbitral
award before a court. In order for the requested court to perform its task
of vacating or confirming an award, a party's adversarial opposition to
the award generally yields a relatively comprehensive account of the
arbitral proceeding and of the basis for the arbitrators' rulings. In a
word, the filing of a motion to vacate the award usually forces the court
to reconstruct the arbitral proceedings. Much of the arbitration gets
rehearsed before the court and the parties ordinarily debate the rectitude
of the arbitrators' determinations. The current approach not only
reduces or eliminates the confidentiality associated with arbitral pro-
ceedings, but it also permits a type of "non-merits" review of the merits
of the litigation. The losing party, in effect, invites the court to partici-
pate as a referee in its challenge of the arbitrators' determination.
Although most of these proceedings result in the enforcement of the
award, the very act of bringing of this type of action has a negative
impact upon the autonomy and independence of the arbitral process.
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Questions regarding the implementation of the new procedure
abound. In particular, if adopted, should it be formalized in statutory
language and become part of the standard basis for review? In other
words, should it be a rule of arbitration law that arbitrators provide a
reasonably comprehensive record of the arbitration in the award suffi-
cient to allow a court to assess and rule upon possible authority conflicts
in the process? Presumably, the documentation could not be used for
other disputes. Must the parties provide for this requirement in their
arbitration agreement or would the requirement be stated or implied at
law? In the latter case, what result if the parties provided to the contrary
in their agreement or during the proceeding? What if the parties stipu-
lated in the arbitral clause that none of the arbitrators' rulings on law or
legal matters could be subject to judicial review? When the authority
conflict involves the application of law, would judicial resolution of the
conflict be unavailable? Should it be difficult to constitute a cause of
action on this basis? Should courts be invested with substantial power
to resolve such conflicts? Should sanctions be imposed if there is party
abuse of the ground on which the case is brought? What might consti-
tute such abuse and what is an appropriate penalty?
Assume that courts conduct the evaluation and that they are sup-
plied with an adequate record upon which to pursue their supervision, on
what substantive rule basis do they base their supervisory activity?
What are the ground rules for the heightened level of judicial involve-
ment? Are arbitrators always expected to follow the letter of the parties'
agreement? Can the arbitrators reverse or ignore a particular facet of the
parties' agreement as long as they respect the provision for arbitration
and the application of law to the merits of the dispute? As noted in the
description of the potential conflicts, what outcome if the arbitrators rule
that the parties' choice-of-law is not a choice-of-law at all? The
UNIDROIT Principles are not enacted law in the traditional sense. Do the
arbitrators have a right to police the arbitration agreement in this fash-
ion? Although the reference to arbitration remains intact and is not
voided by a would-be erroneous choice-of-law, do the arbitrators have
the adjudicatory right to select what they believe to be a "real" law as
the law governing the resolution of the dispute? It could be argued that
the arbitrators' authority to so rule does not necessarily arise, strictly
speaking, from submission to arbitration. Their ruling does not relate to
a dispute between the parties. Rather, it emanates from the designation
of the arbitrators as arbitrators and from their inherent authority, implied
in that designation, to manage and conduct the arbitral proceedings.
The arbitrators' application of the law chosen by the parties, but
their failure either to apply the right provision or to construe it correctly,
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raises a different set of problems relating to judicial supervision and
vacatur. In these circumstances, the wills of sovereign actors do not
clash, but rather the arbitrators arguably implemented the parties' direc-
tive incompetently or negligently. Unless legal rectitude becomes a crit-
ical factor in the enforcement of arbitral awards or the parties demand
the correct application of law in their agreement, errors of law should
not ordinarily result in the vacatur of awards. The exercise of judicial
supervision on this basis would not address fundamental systemic con-
flicts within the process but, instead, would be used to validate and
impose an agreed-upon, customized structure on the standard arbitral
format. The use of judicial authority in this way should be left to party
agreement and the court's discretion.
There is, therefore, a subject matter limit to the contemplated basis
for judicial review. The projected ground is intended exclusively to pro-
vide a means by which to address conflicts of authority among the sig-
nificant actors of the arbitral process. These conflicts seem-at least
initially-to be irreducible because they involve actors who have an
equally strong stake and position in the process. The court-an exter-
nal, non-participating entity-is being asked to privilege one actor's
position and interests to the detriment of the other parties. Each compet-
ing actor has a basis for the assertion of its authority: the parties ground
their authority in contract, and the arbitrators have the authority and
responsibility to manage the proceedings and reach a determination on
the merits. The arbitral institution that is designated in the agreement is
invested with the authority to administer the arbitration under its or other
rules. To some degree, once the parties invoke the arbitration process
through the designated institution and nominate arbitrators, they have
relinquished some of their founding authority and have made themselves
subservient to the authority of the other actors in the process. The dan-
ger in having recourse to judicial supervision to resolve these conflicts
of authority is that the supervision may become too aggressive a form of
policing awards or may generally, by its mere exercise, undermine the
arbitral process.
CODIFYING THE NEW RULES
A possible statutory provision relating to the foregoing discussion
might read:
An international arbitral award can be denied recognition and/or
enforcement in the requested jurisdiction if the reviewing court deter-
mines, upon an inspection of the terms of the award and the allega-
tions of the party challenging the enforcement of the award, that the
arbitrators failed to follow or observe a material part or provision of
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the arbitration agreement relating to choice-of-law, damages, or the
agreement's scope of application. A material deviation from the
express content of the arbitration agreement can lead to the nullity of
the eventual arbitral award, unless it is likely that the arbitrator
departed from the terms of the agreement to uphold the functionality
or the best interests of the particular arbitration and of the arbitration
process generally.
To make judicial supervision possible on this basis, arbitrators
are expected to provide a comprehensive description of the matters
submitted, the parties' positions, the applicable provisions of the gov-
erning law, and the relief that was ordered. In particular, arbitrators
should address and explain circumstances in which their rulings or
decisional methods clearly depart from the express terms of the arbi-
tration agreement. A failure to do so could undermine the enforce-
ability of the award and would entitle a court to reprimand an
arbitrator verbally in its opinion.
The court's inquiry in this and other matters must be confined to
the contents of the award and the parties' respective summary allega-
tions. In deciding such matters, the requested court should recognize
that the contracting parties have exercised their contractual right to
redress their grievances through arbitration, but that the arbitrators bear
the responsibility for making the arbitral process work. While the par-
ties' agreement makes law in the process and can dictate its operation to
a considerable degree, it should be presumed-as a matter of law-that
the parties have not bargained for a dysfunctional or pathological arbi-
tration or to prevent the arbitrators from exercising any adjudicatory dis-
cretion whatsoever.
Therefore, when the arbitrators issue a substantive or procedural
ruling that clearly deviates from the parties' agreement in order to foster
the operation of the arbitration, the award cannot be vacated or nullified
on that basis. It is only when the deviation is based upon a difference of
professional opinion, choice, or mere convenience that it becomes
actionable as a ground for opposing the enforcement of the award.
Errors of law are not a basis for nonenforcement or vacatur, regardless
of whether they are evident, subtle, or a possible matter of opinion,
because legal exactitude is not ordinarily a material basis for the bargain
to arbitrate. The parties, however, are free to provide otherwise.
Accordingly, a requested court with proper jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties can deny recognition and enforcement to
an international arbitral award if: (1) upon an examination of the award
and a consideration of the parties' allegations, it is evident that the arbi-
trators failed to follow a material term of the parties' arbitration agree-
ment and it does not appear from the facts and circumstances that such
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deviation was necessary to the proper operation of the arbitral process;
(2) illicit payments of money or the giving of gifts have been made to
the arbitrators or administrators or favors have been performed for them
with a view toward influencing the process and the eventual result (par-
ticipation in bribery and other forms of corruption can lead to the impo-
sition of civil and criminal sanctions by courts upon the offending
parties, including the arbitrators whose immunity should not cover mat-
ters of corruption); (3) for reasons of self-interest, business interest,
religious, professional, cultural, or personal bias, the arbitrator(s) could
not exercise independent judgment in reviewing the facts, the position of
the parties, or the law, and did not rule impartially in the matter (in
applying this ground for judicial supervision of awards, a reasonable
attempt by the arbitrator to discover possible conflicts should act as a
defense to the inadvertent failure to disclose relevant information
because prospective arbitrators are required to act as a reasonable pro-
fessional person would act in these matters, and a deliberate failure to
disclose relevant and accessible information by arbitrators constitutes an
attempt to corrupt the process and can expose such arbitrators to disci-
plinary and monetary sanctions as may be ordered or recommended by
the requested court); (4) there was a failure of basic notice of the pro-
ceeding and/or the procedure did not provide a meaningful opportunity
to be heard and to present one's case, or one of the parties was subjected
to an alien legal proceeding or procedure that prejudiced its rights and/or
had a bearing upon the outcome of the adjudication; or (5) the award or
procedure leading to the award violates a fundamental rule of interna-
tional public policy such that the enforcement of the award would
amount to a denial of justice.
International arbitral awards cannot be denied recognition or
enforcement, nullified, or vacated because they contain would-be identi-
fiable errors of law. Mistakes as to the applicable text, or the interpreta-
tion of applicable texts, or as to rules or principles do not constitute a
proper legal basis for voiding an award. Inarbitrability of the subject
matter of a dispute can act as a defense to enforcement only if it is
recognized as such a basis in an international convention or instrument
that governs the matter of enforcement.
The foregoing provision attempts to provide codified language that
addresses the issues that surfaced in the discussion regarding an appro-
priate rule predicate. The objective of the recommended rule is to
invoke judicial supervision only for incidents that involve a core or fun-
damental breach of the agreement for arbitration. Nevertheless, the
restrictiveness of the scope of review coincides with meaningful review
and vacatur for conduct or rulings deemed to be impermissible or unac-
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ceptable. It represents an effort to strike a sensible balance between the
nullity of awards, party authority to make law in arbitration, and arbitra-
tor discretion within the process. In this regard, the controlling principle
is that party recourse to arbitration could not have been a decision to
participate in a dysfunctional form or application of arbitration. Finally,
the grounds for nonenforcement take into account contemporary concern
for arbitrator disclosure and impartiality, and eliminate arbitrator immu-
nity in the event of corruption. The latter is a novel recommendation
that is likely to be controversial, but it introduces a measure of arbitrator
accountability into the process. The grounds also emphasize a need for
basic due process and compliance with international public policy; a less
rigorous and more narrowly-drawn version of its domestic counterpart.
Rule indeterminancy is hardly a novel phenomenon in legal doc-
trine. It certainly is not exclusively characteristic of arbitration. Courts
resolve many of the issues that arise in litigation by reference (overt or
implicit) to general formulae that they apply to the facts of the case at
their discretion. The question that arises for the law of arbitration is the
degree of rule indeterminancy in relation to the issues and circumstances
that surface in contemporary arbitrations. Simply stated, the focus of the
rules upon a singular policy and the concomitant superficiality of their
content have not allowed them to keep up with the growing range of
arbitration's scope of application. The current rules do not adequately
clothe the developing body of circumstances in contemporary arbitra-
tion. There is a real danger of dysfunctionality and imbalance between
the legislative authority of rule propositions and the exercise of court
authority in individual cases. The new rules cannot be expected to
resolve fully intractable problems (like sovereign immunity), but it is
reasonable to expect that they will respond sufficiently to the complexity
of the controversies and provide a basis for the rational accommodation
of conflicting interests in a suitably civilized doctrinal framework.
CONCLUSIONS
The story of ICA (and that of its domestic analogue) could not have
been imagined by the most inventive raconteur. In many respects, the
saga of arbitration challenges believability. It is a narrative filled with
the jubilation of success and heroic deeds. Prescient characters struggle
against what appear to be immoveable forces and insurmountable obsta-
cles to prosper and fulfill their destinies. Not only does reality outdo
fantasy, but also the "inglorious" commercial ethos triumphs over the
rhetorical flourish (and falsehood) of political debate. Stability and
actual accomplishment outdistance the empty dialogue of opposing ideo-
logical convictions.
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As the structure of the preceding text reveals, the ballad of arbitra-
tion can be told in crafted and measured segments-self-contained epi-
sodes that are suitable for communication in an oral tradition. The rise
of ICA has clear epic dimensions that warrant being recited as testimony
to the exploits of the international business community. The inaugural
days, however, appear to be at their conclusion. A new era for ICA and
arbitration in general is dawning. It builds upon, but transcends, the
dimensions of the oral tradition. The exuberance of epic symbolism
must now yield to the linearity of an analytical narrative. The text, like
its subject matter, must be altered. The acquisition of civilization estab-
lishes a different reality, role, and expressive discourse for the process.
Conflicts are likely to arise among the sovereign actors who partici-
pate in the process. These conflicts will challenge the basic principle of
authority within the process. The adages of the past seem to provide an
inadequate basis for resolving these conflicts. Rules must become more
demanding in content, and courts need to be relied upon to demarcate
the boundaries of permissible conduct within the process. Sovereign
clashes cannot result in intractable conflict but, rather, must yield to the
balance of competing interests. Beyond the development of new rule
predicates, there is an additional emerging problem for arbitration.
Arbitration, in either its international or domestic form, does not
square well with the basic attributes of democracy. In particular, the use
of adhesion contracts in domestic employment and consumer arbitration
hardly coincides with the principle of individual freedom, no matter how
the courts attempt to redeem these involuntary compacts. The confiden-
tiality of the proceedings and results, the costs of the process, the repeat
player phenomenon, and the lack of reference to a controlling commu-
nity standard all make recourse to domestic arbitration an antidemocratic
exercise. The oppression of the weaker party by the agreement and pro-
cedure, and the concomitant skirting of basic rights and remedies (like
juries, class actions, punitive damages, and civil rights) does not square
with the democratic ethos embedded in the Bill of Rights. In fact, this
type of remedial restriction is especially harsh on minority groups and
the protection of their rights. This state of affairs was created, more-
over, by the United States Supreme Court in its decisional law, i.e., by
the branch of government that is not elected or subject to the public will
and which is most marked by an elitist tradition.
Domestic arbitration and its variegated practices and characteristics
are profoundly contrary to the democratic values that the American
political tradition treasures. Nevertheless, it has not been the subject of
critical outrage or the target of media outcries. Congressional opposi-
tion is so weak and now so formalistic that it can barely be measured. In
20021
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
fact, congressional passivity appears to be masquerading as the "safe"
equivalent of endorsement.236 It seems that all parties accept the Court's
view that the management of limited judicial and adjudicatory resources
requires forced recourse to arbitration for the resolution of civil dis-
putes.237 The inaccessibility of courts makes arbitration necessary if
some measure of justice is to remain accessible to ordinary citizens.
Therefore, recourse to arbitration-no matter how it is achieved-is
always, as a matter of law, in the best interests of all parties. Commen-
tators, other courts, media outlets-in effect, everyone-accepts the
Court's pragmatism and practical disposition. The elite decision-making
is not protested. There are no shrieks denouncing antidemocratic
behavior.
Instead, media complaints 238 about arbitration have been directed to
ICA, especially the binational panels under NAFTA. In one decision
and in several pending cases, the arbitrators who sit on the NAFTA
panels have been asked to rule upon the lawfulness of domestic enact-
ments that allegedly curtail the business interests of foreign companies
incorporated in one of the member states. NAFTA arbitrators appar-
ently have ruled, in the Methanex case,23 9 that a California legislative
enactment banning the sale of a particular chemical ingredient within the
state and manufactured by Methanex amounted to the expropriation of
the company's property because of the loss of projected business oppor-
tunities. As a result, California may owe the Canadian company hun-
dreds of millions of dollars in compensation for the confiscation of its
would-be business advantage and potential.
Thereupon, several media "personalities" launched into a diatribe
against NAFTA and its Chapter 11 procedures. The attack was
expressed through both the written and televised media.24° It centered
upon NAFTA's alleged lack of respect for and apparent annihilation of
domestic United States democratic values. According to the journalists,
236. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995).
237. Id.
238. See Now With Bill Moyers (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 2002). Moyers described his
program with the title and pun "Trading Democracy"; he interviewed a fellow journalist who
writes for The Nation (William Griedler) and who was single-mindedly critical of the NAFTA
dispute resolution mechanisms and an academic writer (Barber or Barbier) who expressed
sympathy for the protests against the World Bank and the IMF. Notes pertaining to the programs
are on file with the author.
239. See Methanex Corp. v. United States, 13 WORLD ARE. & MED. REP. 68 (2002). But see
Canadian Court Sets Aside a Portion of a $16.7 Million Award in First Judicial Appeal of NAFTA
Award, 12 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 275 (2001) (the Government of Mexico applied to the
Supreme Court of British Colombia to set aside the NAFTA award; the court ruled, in the first
judicial appeal of a NAFTA award, that the arbitrator made decisions beyond the scope of the
submission to arbitration, thereby rendering portions of the award inappropriate).
240. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
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NAFTA and its dispute resolution process arose from a conspiracy
among specialized international lawyers bent exclusively upon further-
ing the interests of their multinational corporate clients. It appeared to
amaze the journalistic observers that NAFTA arbitrators were a select
group of specialists who decided the issues of trade litigation in nonpub-
lic, confidential proceedings. They expressed utter incredulity that an
agreed-upon, state-sanctioned transborder adjudicatory mechanism, the
decision-makers of which are appointed by the member states, could
hold a state legislative provision violative of international commercial
norms. Because determinations were not made in a town-meeting set-
ting and had not been reached by the members of a jury, they simply
could not be correct. The Founding Fathers would not approve of this
ominous "court for capital." The corrupt and greedy capitalists had
bought their own international justice which allowed them to subvert
domestic law and domestic political restraints through non-American
processes.
This assessment of NAFTA and ICA, in effect, amounted to mis-
representations pitched at a level of deceit. Nothing was ever said-
and, therefore, understood-about the larger operation and aspirations of
NAFTA. The critics never bothered to communicate an understanding
of the difficulty of international adjudication or of how instrumental a
functional system of adjudication is to the pursuit of international trade.
Without the system of bi-national panels, trade problems among neigh-
boring states could result in the erection of protectionist barriers and the
eventual conduct of highly destructive trade wars. NAFTA allows its
member states to compete more effectively with the European Union
and, as noted earlier, its dispute resolution mechanism includes the pos-
sibility of having individuals arbitrate directly with foreign states the
impact of governmental trade policy upon private commercial transac-
tions. Domestic sovereign policy must yield in the international arena to
the dictates of agreed-upon transborder commercial regulation. Uni-
lateralism, parochialism, nationalism, and state irresponsibility no longer
can be practiced by member states in the NAFTA setting. Presumably,
the violative state conduct can remain operative within the state's terri-
tory as long as the state pays for the damage the enactment or policy
causes to the process of unencumbered trade. Sovereignty can no longer
be a cloak under which the selfish misdeeds of the state are sheltered. In
the transborder trade context, states are fully accountable for their con-
duct, even their regulatory conduct, when sovereignty falsifies the unim-
peded exchange of goods and services. The accountability of state
governments for the impact of their conduct upon international trade is
nothing less than an enabling revolution for the advocates of interna-
tional unity, harmony, and progress.
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Reasonable minds can differ on the sagacity of the bi-national
panel's particular decision regarding expropriation. It may be an exces-
sive principle of accountability; it may reflect a logical conclusion unin-
formed by the necessary experience; or it may be limited to application
in a single case. Arbitrator lists could be amended to include individuals
with a less commercial bent or with experience in both the political and
commercial sectors. Subsequent decisions may reject the determination
completely or may provide modifications or narrow its import. Domes-
tic trial systems also generate mistaken notions of lawful behavior.
"Separate-but-equal," a legal doctrine that institutionalized racism as a
legal form of social organization, resulted from a highly democratic sys-
tem in which the legal process served to protect individuals from the
tyranny of the state or of the majority will. The system eventually cor-
rected the aberration. It also could be the case that the arbitrators on the
bi-national panel are correct or trying to make a point concerning the
system of relationships within NAFTA.
It is, quite frankly, absurd to condemn NAFTA and international
adjudication on the basis of the journalistic perception of the process.
This view is as misguided and ill-conceived as the chants of the socially
and psychologically disaffected demonstrators who appear on the streets
to protest World Bank and IMF meetings. It is simply a false proposi-
tion to assess the legitimacy of the practices and institutions of interna-
tional adjudication by reference to domestic democratic values. As
noted earlier, democracy and transborder processes of law are like oil
and water; they simply do not inform or elucidate each other. Domestic
values and institutions may leave an imprint upon transborder entities
and mechanisms, but the latter function largely upon their own dynamic
and for their own purposes. The goal is not to achieve equality, free-
dom, or the protection of minoritarian interests within a system of
majority rule. Rather, it is to establish a workable rule of law in which
the diversity of the constituent community can be sublimated and pro-
ductive relationships can be achieved in a system of agreed-upon rules.
In this setting, the Jefferson who was Secretary of State and Ambassador
to France is the relevant frame of reference or model. Expertise, sophis-
tication, exposure, tolerance of differences, an ability to articulate a neu-
tral standard and espouse a transcending approach are all factors that are
at a premium.
It is a serious mistake to assess transborder adjudicatory frame-
works through myopic domestic eyes. It is equally flawed, even in the
aftermath of Enron, to castigate corporate enterprises for attempting to
facilitate their profit-making goals at an international level. Making
money is not a criminal act nor does it imply corruption. Rather, the real
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mistake and danger is to turn a blind eye to the challenge that domestic
arbitration presents to democracy and democratic values. It is in that
sector that patent unfairness and overreaching for questionable, perhaps
illicit, corporate purposes are taking place. It is unfortunate that arbitra-
tion is used in this fashion by corporate actors and that courts affirm this
exploitation of the remedy.24" ' Despite its practical utility, arbitration
done in this manner signals the eventual demise of the Bill of Rights and
the redefinition of American citizenship within the United States.242
241. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Beyond Trilogies: A New Bill of Rights and Law Practice
Through the Contract of Arbitration, 6 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 1 (1995).
242. Id.
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